Labour markets in space. Essays on commuting and labour market pooling. by Torfs, Wouter
FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN
BEDRIJFSWETENSCHAPPEN
KATHOLIEKE
UNIVERSITEIT
LEUVEN
Labour Markets in Space
Essays on commuting and labour market pooling
Proefschrift voorgedragen tot
het behalen van de graad van
Doctor in de Economische
Wetenschappen
door
Wouter TORFS
Nummer 486 2015

In loving memory of my parents, Victor Torfs & Alexandra Deheyder

Doctoral committee
Promotor:
prof. dr. Joep Konings KU Leuven
Members:
prof. dr. Erik Buyst KU Leuven
prof. dr. Klaus Desmet Universidad Carlos III, Madrid
prof. dr. Maarten Goos KU Leuven
prof. dr. Stijn Vanormelingen KU Leuven & HU Brussel
Daar de proefschriften in de reeks van de Faculteit Economie en
Bedrijfswetenschappen het persoonlijk werk zijn van hun auteurs, zijn alleen deze
laatsten daarvoor verantwoordelijk
i
ii
Acknowledgements
Joep. You always told us that obtaining a PhD is not just an intellectual exercise,
but equally important, a test of perseverance. Well, I persevered... for 6 years, 8
months and 3 days.1 I’m pretty sure that if I would have listened better to your
instructions from the very beginning, it would have been finished a long time
ago. But I’m also sure that if you would not have given me the opportunity to
learn from my mistakes, I would not have been the economist I am today. You
taught me how it is impossible to become a good researcher from behind my
university desk and never left an opportunity unused to stress the importance
of policy relevant research topics. I am confident that in the years to come, the
lessons you taught me will become even more clear2, to remain a guideline
throughout my future career. So thanks for putting up with me for all this
time and providing me with the opportunity to obtain a doctorate. And thanks
for not just being a professor, but also a human being. And also, thanks a lot
for occasionally barging into our office and having Luca get you a kip-curry
sandwich. That never failed to brighten my day.
And of course, I would also like to thank my committee members, Erik Buyst,
Klaus Desmet, Maarten Goos and Stijn Vanormelingen, for the effort they put
into reading the entire manuscript. I truly appreciate it and the comments you
provided contributed significantly to the overall quality of this dissertation, but
also my future writings. Please accept my apologies for the delay in finishing up!
And Hylke, thanks a lot for your short notice availability to act as chairwoman
of this committee.
Damiaan. Joep sometimes referred to you as my second supervisor. I rather
consider you as an annoying peer with a profound love for criticising colleagues.
Admittedly, your criticism was mostly3 justified. But more importantly, it was
motivated by altruism.4 For as long as I know you, you have always unselfishly
helped anybody who stopped by your office for advice. Whether it took you five
minutes, or a day, you would always come up with some solution, regardless
of the problem at hand. You had a huge influence on how I work, think and
write.5 But you also made me a better co-worker and person. Thank you for
that.
1Granted, with a break, a visit to the EIB and a premature departure to the IPTS.
2Being the stubborn, slow learner that I am.
3Mostly. Mostly.
4And maybe a little bit of intellectual vanity, admit it!
5Although I’m not entirely sure whether Joep feels this is actually a good thing!
iii
iv Acknowledgements
Greet. I cannot thank you enough for your support over all these years. From a
simple6 ‘Hello’ in the morning, to the comforting words when times got tough,
your presence made my stay at Vives so much more pleasant. Even now, from
2000km away, I can still count on you if I need a favour! The ‘two words’ do
not do justice the extent of my appreciation for your kindness, but here they
are nevertheless: thank you!
Koen (Algoed). Thanks for hiring me as a researcher at Vives. Unfortunately our
ways parted in the very beginning of my scholarly career, when you left Vives
to become Chief of Staff for some ‘super-minister’ in the Flemish government. I
enjoyed the short time I could work with you and am grateful for your guidance
during my very first steps in the academic world.
And my colleagues, in order of appearance:
Goesaert. Thanks for falling down flat on the hallway floor the first time I met
you, only to pretend it did not happen afterwards.7 That must have been the
worst first impression ever. And thanks for the discussions, beers and drunken
karaoke moment. Liqiu. Thanks a lot for your patience while writing a paper
together, the knowledge and laughs we shared in your office, and the ‘dog
tongues’.8 Luca. You and I couldn’t possibly be more different. Unfortunately
for you9, faith10 brought us together and had us share an office for nearly four
years. Soon, I came to appreciate you not only as a colleague, but mostly as
a friend. I have probably learned much more from you than I’d like to admit.
Stefaan. We shared knowledge, beers, laughs and frustration. By the end,
mostly frustration.11 I really believe you would have made a great academic.
But probably an even better consultant. Geert. Thanks for constantly forcing
me to refresh my knowledge of basic statistical concepts. You never failed to
amaze me by turning nearly every topic into a political discussion.12 I have
enormous respect for the non-trivial career path you chose and I don’t think I
would have the courage to do the same. Kristel. Your passage through Vives
was brief, but long enough for you and I to become and remain close friends.
You reminded me that once in a while it is good to reflect on your goals and
question your motives. These are important life lessons, so thank you for that.
6Yet consistently enthusiastic!
7I saw your feet slipping through the door opening!
8You know, ‘dogs’, those things that fly around in the park?!
9Or me.
10= Joep.
11You quite a bit faster than I, but let’s leave that for the footnote here.
12If I ever gave you the impression I wasn’t really listening to what you were saying, by all
means, this was also the case.
Acknowledgements v
Marieke. You helped me through the final stage of my PhD, by listening to my
complaints, laughing with my dumb jokes, or pretending I was making sense
when I tried to explain you random thing about statistics or economics. I still
hear you on a weekly basis. And I’m planning to keep it that way.13 Stijn V.
Thanks for the insightful discussions over smoking-breaks. Jo. I’m sure your
iron discipline will keep Vives on the right track. Thanks for the discussions and
advice. Koen. Thanks for not kicking me out of your office when I was chatting
with Marieke. Stijn D, Cathy, Lieselot, Jakob, Ilke, Elodie, Annelore, Mathias.
Thanks for being great colleagues. And thanks to all other PhD-peers that have
somehow impacted me, my research, or both, during my time at the university.
My friends at home. Thanks for keeping one of my feet out of academics for all
these years! And the same goes for my fellow students and the staff from the
Pope-college, especially during the start of my PhD. Thanks V.C. for proofreading
the final manuscript.14
Gizem. My best friend and companion. Undoubtedly, of all people in my
surroundings, it was you who suffered most over the past couple of months. So
maybe more than for me, this PhD was a test of your perseverance. You passed
Cum Laude. Congratulations! Seni ben yerim.
Tuur, Lief, Casimir. You might be surprised to find your names here in the
acknowledgment section of my doctoral dissertation, but by being the best
neighbours a guy can wish for, you contributed to this dissertation more than
you can imagine. Thanks for the care and support you provided my mother
over the years. You are amazing people.
Mum, Dad. Thanks for letting me find my own way in life, while watching
on the sidelines, always being ready with advice. Thanks for letting me make
my own choices, my own mistakes, over, and over, and over again. Whatever
happened, I knew I could always go home and find you there with open arms,
with love and support. It brought me where I am today and where I will go
tomorrow. You didn’t stick around to see me finish this. Otherwise, I could have
told you how I owe this all to you. All of this. All that was, is, and will be. I
just got lucky to have had the best parents in the world. That’s it.
Wouter Torfs
Leuven, July 2015
13Unless you find a job at the OECD before I do. You are warned.
14I forgive you for giving up after page 60.
vi
Contents
Introduction: Labour Markets in Space 1
1 A Gravity Equation for Commuting 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 A micro-founded gravity equation for commuting . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.1 Deriving a micro-founded gravity equation for commuting 12
1.2.2 Trade literature versus Spatial interaction theory . . . . . 16
1.3 Estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 The effect of regional borders on commuting . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.1 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.2 Estimation results, base specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.3 Estimation results, comparison with doubly-constrained
model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.4 Estimation results, relaxing assumptions on commuting
costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 The effect of borders on wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2 Scale Effects in the Labour Market 39
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Labour market scale & Matching quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2.1 Random search and the aggregate matching function . . 41
2.2.2 Empirical estimates of the scale elasticity . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2.3 Micro-foundations for a DMP IRS matching function . . . 47
2.2.4 The stock-flow approach to matching . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3 Labour market scale & Matching quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.1 Non-hierarchical heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.2 Hierarchical heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Labour market scale & Risk-sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
vii
3 Urban Labour Market Pooling, Sorting and Mobility Costs 61
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.1 The Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2.3 Illustration of the equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2.4 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3.1 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3.2 Graphical illustration of the model’s driving mechanisms 81
3.4 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.1 Measuring the strength of matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.2 Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.5.1 Match Quality and Size of labour Market . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4 Functional Labour Markets in Belgium 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Data description. Commuting flows in Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5 Belgian Travel-To-Work-Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.6 Some applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.6.1 Evolution of time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.6.2 Sector-specific TTWAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.6.3 Gender-specific TTWAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.7 Summary & discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A Appendix 133
A.1 Chapter 3 - extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
A.1.1 Extension: worker migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
A.1.2 Housing market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.1.3 Relocation of firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.2 Data cleaning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
viii
List of Figures
1 Unemployment rates for Belgian municipalities in 2008 . . . . . 3
1.1 Unemployment rates for Belgian municipalities in 2008 . . . . . 10
1.2 The main commuting flows in Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 The predicted wage-effect of removing regional borders. . . . . . 35
1.4 Directional border effects and municipal equilibrium wages . . . 36
3.1 Structure of the urban economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2 Equilibrium without inter-district job search . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3 Equilibrium with inter-district job search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4 Vacancy density in region A and B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.5 The impact of commuting costs on reservation wages in B . . . . 78
3.6 Commuting rate and size of labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.7 Number of firms and size of labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.8 Spatial distribution of population and match quality . . . . . . . 88
4.1 The X -equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2 The 2007-TTWAs for the aggregate economy . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3 Evolution of the Belgian TTWAs over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4 The TTWAs for the manufacturing sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.5 The TTWAs the service sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.6 The 2007-TTWAs for the public sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.7 The TTWAs for Males and Females . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.8 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.9 Functional versus administrative areas: unemployment rates . . 115
A.1 Equilibrium: Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.2 Skill Distribution in Region A and B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
ix
x
List of Tables
1.1 Estimating the gravity equation with a single border dummy . . 25
1.2 Testing the coefficient restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3 Estimation results of Wilson’s doubly-constrained model . . . . . 28
1.4 Estimating the gravity equation with heterogeneous border effects 31
1.5 Testing the coefficient restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6 Language knowledge in Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1 Empirical evidence on increasing returns to scale . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1 Match Quality and the Size of labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.1 Statistics for the aggregate 2007 Belgian TTWA algorithm . . . . 110
A.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.2 Robustness check: alternative measure of firm type . . . . . . . . 138
A.3 Robustness checks: excluding Brussels and multi-plant firms . . 139
A.4 Robustness check: population density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.5 Robustness check: commuting time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
xi
xii
Labour Markets in Space
Space has a highly tangible effect on our daily labour market activities and
decisions. Its impact manifests itself through a variety of channels, of which
commuting is arguably the most tangible. Commuting is costly. In part, because
it takes time. A lot of time. And time is money. On average, a Belgian worker
spends one hour a day getting to and from work (Verhetsel et al., 2007). The
time cost of commuting is an opportunity cost, intrinsically related to a worker’s
wage. Van Ommeren & Fosgerau (2009) demonstrate that the marginal cost
associated with one hour of commuting amounts to 17 Euro. Off-the-back-of-
my-envelope,15 this totals to 24.7 billion Euro for the entire Belgian economy
in 2015, nearly 5 percent of expected 2015 GDP! And this does not consider
the fixed part of the time costs, nor other fixed costs that are unrelated to the
duration of the commuting journey. Admittedly, these back-off-the-envelope
calculations are all rather raw, but they illustrate nicely the drastic impact of
space on the labour market in particular and the economy in general.
This dissertation consists of four distinct chapters. The analysis in Chapter 1
borrows a concept from natural sciences to identify and quantify the different
spatial component of the commuting cost, with a particular emphasis on regional
border effects, a topic particularly relevant in the Belgian context. In Chapter 2,
I discuss how congestion externalities, such as rising commuting costs, can be
15Van Ommeren & Fosgerau (2009)’s analysis used 2002-data for the Netherlands, but given
income differences between Belgium and the Netherlands are minor, it is safe to assume
Belgians value their time similarly. Assuming an average annual inflation of 2 percent over
13 years, this amounts to 22 Euro anno 2015. Total commuting costs are evaluated at their
marginal costs, for 4 500 000 workers who commute on average one hour a day for 250 days
per year.
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reconciled with the increasing rate of urbanisation observed in reality. Chapter
3 combines the two central concepts of the previous chapters, commuting costs
and labour market pooling effects, and analyses their combined impact on the
labour market outcome of workers of different skill levels in an urban economics
framework. Finally, Chapter 4 describes a tool to visualise the geographic extent
of local labour markets and applies it to the Belgian municipalities.
The idea for Chapter 1 originated from a little map I have had lying around my
university desk somewhere, for what must have been my entire scholarly career
(figure 1). I came across it for the first time when I was writing my master
thesis on regional unemployment disparities, back in 2007, even before I was
enrolled in the doctoral program.16 The map illustrates the spatial distribution
of unemployment in Belgium at the municipality level. I deliberately omitted the
markers of the regional borders. I challenge the reader to take a pencil and try
to trace out the border separating the Belgian NUTS1 regions, Brussels, Flanders
and Wallonia.17 While within-country differences in regional unemployment
rates are not uncommon, the stark contrast in the labour market outcomes of
adjacent municipalities fascinated me. This led to the idea to try to analyze
the impact of spatial frictions imposed by the language border on Belgian
regional labour market outcomes. No sooner said than done, this gave rise
to the analysis set out in Chapter 1. I use a gravity equation framework to
quantify the impact of regional borders on the spatial distribution of commuter
flows. The term ‘gravity equation’ undoubtedly sounds familiar to all but those
that did not make it through their fourth year of high school. It has its roots
in what must be one of the most influential scientific publications in human
history, Newton’s Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica. Wikipedia quotes
Newton’s law of universal gravitation as follows: ‘Any two bodies in the universe
attract each other with a force that is directly proportional to the product of
their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between
them’. Economists have applied analogies to Newton’s gravitational theorem
16I believe it was Damiaan Persyn who first showed it to me. He was my thesis supervisor at
the time and became a co-author of this chapter later.
17In chapter 1, section 1.1 you can find the version with regional border marks to check how
many municipalities you misallocated!
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Figure 1: Unemployment rates for Belgian municipalities in 2008
to explain economic flows running in between two economic entities, most
often in a spatial context. The flows can be just about anything: shopping
trips, telephone calls, but most importantly in the context of this chapter:
trade flows and commuters. Newton’s gravitational law for commuter flows
between locations would model the number of commuters going from A to
B as a function of the distance travelled, and two proxies for the size of both
locations. While some might argue the analogy is far-fetched, this chapter
demonstrates how to derive a Newton-type gravity equation from a tractable
labour market model. The approach builds on the work of J. Anderson &
Van Wincoop (2003), who originally proposed this framework in the context of
international trade theory. Interestingly, the resulting gravity equation for trade
flows shows some remarkable similarities with the doubly constrained gravity
equation developed by A. G. Wilson (1967), a workhorse model from spatial
interaction theory. This chapter is the first to explicitly bridge the gap between
these two rich gravity traditions. Similar to the gravity-trade literature, spatial
interaction theory deals with economic flows between locations in relation
4 Labour Markets in Space: General Introduction
to local supply and demand, yet both strands have been co-existing mostly
parallel to one another for several decades with little or no cross-references
linking them. Linking the two can provide fertile ground for future advances in
either literature. Gravity equations in spatial interaction models have mostly
been set up without micro-foundations and have rather relied on analogies
from statistical mechanics. This contrasts with the trade literature, in which
gravity equations are built from economic models where demand and supply
are derived from optimising behaviour of economic agents. Interaction theory
has been much more focussed on the role of the so-called constraints imposed
on the empirical model, something which has been largely ignored by trade
theorists. In J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003)’s model, for example, the
constraints enter naturally through the derivation of labour demand and a
‘spatial equilibrium condition’. The choice of constraints is non-trivial, as they
enforce a relationship between the size of locations in the spatial system and the
flows running between them. The doubly-constrained framework for example
avoids that doubling the number of workers in the system leads to a quadrupling
of the total number of worker flows. It implies that if the number of workers
and jobs in the economy doubles, the total number of commuters18 in the
economy also doubles. This makes sense in the context of commuting. In the
case of a trade model however, this exact correspondence between the size
measures of trading partners (GDP) and the total production of the economy
under consideration might break down due to certain factors, such as increasing
returns to scale in production, for example. I take the gravity model to the
data, using a Belgian municipality-level commuting trip matrix and quantify
the deterrent effect of regional borders on the commuting behaviour of Belgian
workers.
The entire analysis of Chapter 1 revolves around the adverse impact of transport
costs on labour market commuting decisions. High levels of commuting costs
are typically a by-product of the spatial concentration of economic activity.
Progressing urbanisation in Western countries, and beyond, have led to record
levels of road congestion. In addition, urban pollution, towering real estate
18The total number of commuters is simply the total amount of job-worker linkages.
Labour Markets in Space: General Introduction 5
prices and rising crime levels add to the unpleasantness of urban life. This
begs the question what drives people to flock together in these congested ag-
glomerated areas in the first place. Back in the nineteenth century, Marshall
(1890) listed three sources of positive externalities brought about by the geo-
graphic concentration of economic activity: input sharing, knowledge spillovers,
and labour market pooling. The first category certainly holds intuitive appeal.
Given the advances in modern day transport infrastructure, it does not seem
likely that the availability of a wide variety of inputs is a significant driver of
agglomeration at the city-level. The second category, unmistakably important in
Marshall’s time, just sounds plain silly in this day and age. That leaves us with
the third category, the one that I feel is most interesting, intuitive and arguably
most relevant at an urban scale. Labour market pooling refers to situations
where labour market scale positively affects aggregate urban outcomes, such
as productivity, wages and unemployment. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on
labour market pooling. The relationship between labour market scale and the
efficiency of the matching process between firms and workers takes a prominent
place throughout the exposition. On the one hand, scale can simply make it
easier for workers to find a job. Therefore, some authors have argued that urban
scale affects the rate at with workers and firms form matches, or the quantity
of matches. Others have made a compelling argument why there might not be
such a relationship: the wide-spread availability of potential options can make
urban workers more choosy in which offer to accept.19 In this case, the effect of
labour market scale would work through the match quality, rather than quantity.
Finally, a third channel through which labour market related mechanisms affect
the attractiveness of urban areas is their risk-sharing capability. Large labour
markets allow individual firms and workers to take shelter from the adverse
effects of labour demand shocks. This chapter is structured around these three
main categories. This is the first survey paper devoted entirely to labour market
pooling, thoroughly linking theory to existing empirical evidence. It will provide
an overview of what has been done in the field, and can serve as a source of
inspiration for scholars who are looking to further explore this fascinating topic.
19And vice versa for firms.
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Chapter 3 examines how commuting costs impact labour market decisions of
workers from different skill groups, when search activities are subject to scale
effects, one of the forms of labour market pooling externalities discussed in
Chapter 2.20 In chapter 1 the commuting costs are intrinsically connected to
the wage. Firms produce with a love-of-variety for workers from different
locations, resulting in a geographical commuting pattern that is demand driven.
In contrast, the theoretical model of Chapter 3 is built around a bipolar urban
setting with labour markets that are characterised by search frictions (Coulson
et al., 2001) and populated by heterogeneous agents on both sides of the
market. After workers and firms match, production proceeds in pairs using
a production technology with skill-complementarity in production (Shimer
& Smith, 2000). Commuting costs are fixed and unrelated to earnings. The
commuting decision of workers is driven by a selection effect and is the outcome
of the interaction between this fixed mobility costs, labour market pooling effects
and skill complementaries in production.
Chapter 4 visualizes the Belgian regional labour market using the Travel-To-
Work-Area (TTWA) methodology of Bond & Coombes (2007). Traditionally,
administratively delimited regions traditionally form the basis for data collection
and the economic analysis of labour markets. Their borders are often drawn
arbitrarily or rest on a purely historic basis. Consequently, there is no reason
to believe that administrative regions correspond to a labour market in any
economically relevant sense. In contrast to administratively delimited labour
markets, the boundaries of functional labour markets are rooted in the behavior
of economic agents. The methodology of this chapter applies a mathematical
algorithm to a matrix of Belgian municipality-level commuting trips to construct
11 aggregate functional local labour markets. The average size of the TTWAs is
closely related to the commuting propensity of workers. A highly mobile work
force implies larger and fewer functional labour markets.
The final section concludes this dissertation by reflecting on some of its policy
implications.
20This chapter is joined work with Liqiu Zhao, assistant professor at Beijing’s Renmin University.
Chapter 1
A Gravity Equation for Commuting
1.1 Introduction
Commuting is an important spatial equilibrating mechanism in the labour
market. In standard closed-economy labour market models, commuting reduces
disparities in regional labour market outcomes such as unemployment rates
and wages, and brings aggregate welfare gains (see for example Borjas, 2001).
Commuting is costly, however. One can think of obvious costs that are directly
related to commuting distance, such as straightforward travel expenses or
the opportunity cost of a lengthy daily commute. Additionally, there exist
less tangible but nonetheless substantial costs when a worker commutes to
a different region. These costs could arise from, for example, informational
deficiencies, linguistic barriers or a regional cultural divide. They explain
the difference between the expected commuting flows between regions based
on purely economic and geographic factors, and observed commuting flows.
Such ‘missing interregional commuting’ suggests an inefficient spatial allocation
of labour, implying that welfare gains can be obtained from policies aimed at
removing these barriers, for example by improving information exchange related
to interregional job search, adjusting the regional skill structure, investing in
language education, etc. This should be especially beneficial for countries with
7
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marked differences in regional labour market performance, as is the case for
many European countries.
This chapter quantifies the effect of regional borders on commuting by means
of a gravity framework and while doing so bridges the gap between the gravity
traditions developed in the context of international trade on the one hand and
spatial interaction modelling on the other. Our gravity equation is derived from
a small spatial labour market model inspired by J. Anderson & Van Wincoop
(2003), in which firms characterised by a love-of-variety production function
employ workers from different locations. In the spatial interaction literature,
gravity equations have mostly been set up without micro-foundations and have
rather relied on analogies from statistical mechanics (see A. Wilson, 2010, for a
review) or on discrete choice theory (Anas, 1983; Fotheringham, 1986). The
development of gravity equations in the context of international trade has taken
a different route, relying on economic models where demand and/or supply
are derived from optimising behaviour of economic agents and the gravity
equation describes the resulting market-clearing flow of goods. Applying the
latter approach in a labour market setup results in a functional form for the
gravity equation which is remarkably similar to the functional form of the
doubly constrained specification often used in spatial interaction modelling, but
nevertheless differs from it in some important aspects. Measures of fit suggest
that our approach improves commuting flow predictions. We also argue that it
enables us to more accurately identify the border effect by taking into account
economic push and pull factors.
The commuting gravity equation is empirically estimated by means of a count
model. Count models allow for zero as a possible outcome and avoid the biases
introduced by estimating log-linearised models in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). The empirical application uses aggregate data
on commuting flows between 580 Belgian municipalities1 in 2008. Belgium is
1Nine municipalities belonging to the small German speaking community of Belgium were
excluded from the analysis. This leaves 580 out of a total of 589 Belgian municipalities in the
sample. Including the German community in the sample and estimating a separate border
effect for this group would increase our number of directional border effects from 9 to 16.
At the same time, these additional border effects would be difficult to estimate given the
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an interesting case for the study at hand for a number of reasons:
Regional borders are important in Belgium. Belgium is a multilingual country,
consisting of three NUTS1 regions; Flanders in the north, and Wallonia in the
south are officially unilingually Dutch and French speaking regions, respectively.
The central capital region of Brussels is officially bilingual, but de facto a majority
of the local population speaks French (Janssens, 2008). Nevertheless, many jobs
in Brussels require knowledge of both French and Dutch. Belgium is a federal
state, with regional governments in each of the three NUTS1 regions. Successive
reforms of the Belgian state resulted in an increasing degree of independence
for the regions, for example with regards to active labour market policy. The
socio-cultural divide between the regions is large. With the exception of the
capital region of Brussels, there exist no cross-regional political parties which
are represented in the national parliament. None of the dominant newspapers
and television chains target-audience comprises all three regions.
The three Belgian regions are also characterized by strong and persistent differ-
ences in economic performance. The capital region of Brussels is unmistakably
the centre of Belgian economic activity, hosting 17 percent of total Belgian
payroll employment. Despite being Belgium’s most important economic hub,
the Brussels unemployment rate is the highest in the country. This can also be
seen in Figure 1.1, which shows unemployment rates for 2008 at the municipal
level and illustrates the stark contrast between the labour market performance
of Brussels, where unemployment reached 16 percent, and Flanders, where un-
employment was only 3.9 percent. At 10.1 percent, the Walloon unemployment
rate was also significantly higher than in Flanders. These regional differences
in labour market performance arose in the aftermath of the seventies oil-crises
and the decline of traditional steel and coal industries, and have persisted ever
since (Torfs, 2008).2 It is noteworthy how the linguistic and regional borders
small number of municipalities, the small size of their labour markets and their remoteness
from Flanders and Brussels . Moreover, these German municipalities do not constitute a legal
geographical entity with the same level of competences as the Walloon, Flemish and Brussels
regions.
2Remarkable is also that the exact location of the historically important coal basin in Wallonia
can still be clearly recognised, running East-West and parallel to the language border, although
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in Belgium can be clearly recognized on this map of municipal unemployment
rates. Municipalities in Brussels and Wallonia have consistently higher un-
employment rates compared to their Flemish counterparts located just a few
kilometres away.
2% - 4%
5%
6%
7% - 8%
9%
10% - 11%
12% - 14%
15% - 18%
19% - 21%
22% - 31%
Figure 1.1: Unemployment rates for Belgian municipalities in 2008
Figure 1.2 uncovers the salient spatial patterns of commuting flows in Belgium,
aggregating flows at the district level.3 Only inter-district flows containing more
than 3000 workers are shown and larger commuting flows are represented by
thicker lines. Also here, the role of the central capital region of Brussels as the
nation’s most important employment centre becomes clear from the web of
commuting lines surrounding it. The northern city of Antwerp and the western
the last mine in this area closed in 1984.
3A district or ‘arrondissement’ is the second smallest level of administrative regions in Belgium
of which there are 43 in total.
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Figure 1.2: The main commuting flows in Belgium
city of Ghent play an important role for the northern region of Flanders. In
the southern region of Wallonia, most commuting takes place between and
around the cities of the axis Mons-Charleroi-Liège. Notably, there is not one
district-level commuting flow running between the northern region of Flanders
and the southern region of Wallonia that contains more than 3000 workers.
If one considers pairs of municipalities at a distance between 10 and 30 km,
there are on average 7.5 times less commuters between a pair of municipalities
separated by the Flemish-Walloon regional border, as compared to pairs of
municipalities at similar distances, but within both regions. These findings are
striking since there are no legal or administrative barriers to labour mobility
across regions whatsoever.
The gravity model developed in this chapter provides a framework to analyse
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the determinants of the spatial structure of commuter flows that is illustrated
in Figure 1.2. After controlling for factors such as the geographic distribution
of workers and jobs, and the travel time by public transport and by car, it is
found that regional borders remain a significant hurdle to commuting. Our
findings are in line with Falck et al. (2012), who use data on historic language
differences between German dialects as a proxy for contemporary cultural
differences and find that these form a hurdle to migration flows. This deterrent
effect of regional borders on labour mobility offers a possible explanation for
the lack of correlation in regional labour market outcomes across borders as
observed by Fuchs-Schündeln & Bartz (2012). Given the large disparities in
local labour market performance, our results therefore suggest that a lot can
be gained from policies that reduce the deterrent effects of regional borders
on labour mobility, such as improving language education or promoting cross-
border cultural exchange.
1.2 A micro-founded gravity equation for commut-
ing
1.2.1 Deriving a micro-founded gravity equation for com-
muting
Our derivation of a gravity equation for commuting builds on J. Anderson &
Van Wincoop (2003), who derive a gravity equation for international trade
flows. The labour supply of a locality is assumed to be fixed and workers are
residentially immobile. Commuting is the only form of labour mobility available
to workers. For the sake of simplicity, assume that each locality hosts a single
firm. The firm operating in locality d produces output Yd using a CES technology
with labour differentiated by locality as the sole input.
The assumption that labour is differentiated across localities seems strong. We
argue that, apart from offering a convenient functional form, this assumption
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captures some essential spatial features of the labour market. Labour market
agents come in all shapes and forms and not all varieties fit well together: a
worker’s skill set can differ from an employer’s educational requirements, a
worker’s career prospects can differ from those on offer or a worker’s person-
ality might simply not fit a firm’s corporate culture. Preferably, workers and
employers in search for a perfect partner would want to avoid having to bear
large commuting costs and therefore will search for a suitable match nearby.
But in very heterogeneous labour markets, the chances of finding the right
match locally are slim. Firms and workers could wait until random shocks free
up a suitable partner nearby, but will often find that the opportunity costs of
waiting outweighs the commuting cost of matching with a partner at more
distant locations. If matches are broken randomly over time and tangible or
intangible costs to moving residence are high, we would end up in a situation
where firms source workers from different localities, which is captured by our
model. The value of remote workers might simply lie in their availability at the
time of the vacancy posting. A similar dynamic matching process is described
by Hausmann et al. (2013), where firms that locate in a region in which they
are an industry pioneer face uncertainty about the relevant characteristics of
the local workforce. They consequently choose to hire non-local workers that
possess the required industry experience. Their empirical findings suggest that
these firms do form some suboptimal matches with local workers, but expand
their geographic recruiting distance for key-workers. This is analogous with
the spatial commuting pattern generated by our model. Rosen (1978) and
Dupuy (2012) discuss in greater detail some formal derivations of aggregate
CES production function using microfoundations that rely on worker and job
heterogeneity and matching.
More formally, write Cod for the amount of labour from locality o used by the
firm in locality d. The production function is given by
Yd =

R∑
o=1
(AoCod)
σ−1
σ
 σ
σ−1
,
where the parameter Ao reflects differences in the productivity of the local
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workforce. The parameter σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
workers from different localities.
A firm from locality d which minimizes costs conditional on some exogenous
output level has the following demand for locality o’s labour:
Cod = w
−σ
od

1
AoΩd
1−σ R∑
o=1
wod Cod , (1.1)
where wod is the wage earned by workers commuting from o to d, and
Ωd =

R∑
o=1

wod
Ao
1−σ 11−σ
(1.2)
is the wage index faced by firms in d. We will write Bd ≡∑Ro=1 wod Cod for firm
d ’s total wage bill.
Commuting is costly, and hence a spatial equilibrium where all workers are
indifferent to their location of work requires the firm in d to pay a higher wage
wod to commuting workers from o, compared to the wage wo these workers
would earn locally. We assume that commuting costs are a fixed proportion
of wages and write τod − 1> 0 for the commuting cost between o and d as a
fraction of wo. A spatial equilibrium then requires wod = woτod . Note that τod
can be interpreted as an implicit wasteful ad-valorem tax on commuting. This
functional form implies that commuting costs do not contain a fixed component.
This formulation simplifies the analysis significantly4.
Next, write Eo for the total earnings of all workers living in locality o
Eo ≡
R∑
d=1
wod Cod . (1.3)
Substituting equation (1.1) into (1.3) and using wod = woτod allows to write
4As I illustrated in the introduction of this dissertation, opportunity costs are a non-negligible
part of total commuting costs.
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local wages wo as: 
wo
Ao
1−σ
=
Eo∑R
d=1

τod
Ωd
(1−σ)
Wd
. (1.4)
This in turn can be substituted into equation (1.1) to get:
wod Cod =
Eo∑R
d=1

τod
Ωd
(1−σ)
Wd

τod
Ωd
1−σ
Wd , (1.5)
Next, define Y T as the total wage bill paid (and earned) in the economy, and
define bd = Wd/Y T and eo = Eo/Y T , which are the shares of d ’s wagebill and
o’s earnings, respectively, such that equation (1.5) becomes:
wod Cod =
EoWd
Y T

τod
ΠoΩd
1−σ
, (1.6)
with
Π′o ≡ Π(1−σ)o =

R∑
d=1

τod
Ωd
(1−σ)
bd

. (1.7)
After substituting the expression for (Ao/wo)
(1−σ) from equation (1.4) into
equation (1.2), Ωd can be written as:
Ω′d ≡ Ω(1−σ)d =

R∑
o=1

τod
Πo
(1−σ)
eo

(1.8)
Equations (1.6) to (1.8) are the labour market equivalents of the J. Anderson &
Van Wincoop (2003) gravity model for trade flows. To express commuter flows
in quantities, rather than monetary flows as customary in the international trade
literature, we rewrite equation (1.6) in terms of number of workers, by using
the fact that wod = woτod and therefore Eo =
∑R
d=1 wod Cod = wo
∑R
d=1τod Cod:
Cod =
EoWd
Y T
τ−σod

1
Π′oΩ′d

(1.9)
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where Eo =
∑R
d=1τod Cod is the new adjusted mass variable for the locality of
origin.
Equation (1.9) is our final gravity equation, derived from a spatial labour market
model. Together with equations (1.7) and (1.8) it represents the system of
equations describing commuting flows. The origin mass variable equals the
sum of all bilateral commuter flows originating from that locality, weighing
each flow by its bilateral commuting costs. The mass variable of the locality of
destination is simply the total wage bill in that locality.
In line with J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003), the gravity equation contains
an origin-specific term, Π′o, and a destination specific term, Ω
′
d . These terms
are similar to the factors which J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003) label
‘multilateral resistance terms’ (or MR-terms) in the context of international
trade and serve as control variable for the economic surroundings of the locality.
Both depend on all bilateral commuting costs in the economy and on the
distribution of economic activity around the origin and destination locality.
Intuitively, the flow of commuters between o and d depends not only on the
bilateral commuting costs and the economic variables of both municipalities,
but also on their surroundings. The MR-terms thus contain all alternatives
for workers in locality o or firms in locality d. Controlling for Ω′d and Π
′
o
incorporates the entire spatial structure of the economy into the equation. As
emphasized by J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003), ignoring the MR-terms
leads to biased parameter estimates.
1.2.2 Trade literature versus Spatial interaction theory
Gravity equations have a long tradition in fields other than international trade
theory, most notably in the field of spatial interaction modelling. Often, these
gravity equations are not formally derived from underlying behavioural as-
sumptions or theory. International trade has been an exception in this respect.
J. E. Anderson (1979) provided the theoretical foundations that largely served
as a basis for the development of gravity equations in the international trade
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literature. This evolution has occurred largely parallel to the developments
taking place in spatial interaction modelling. However, there are some striking
similarities between the relatively recent J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003)
model and some older spatial interaction models, more precisely the Wilson
doubly constrained model.
A naive gravity equation for commuting could start with the assumption that
commuter flow Fod between an origin o and destination d can be modelled as
a multiplicative function of (1) the number of workers in the origin o (No =∑
d Fod), (2) the number of jobs in the destination d (Jd =
∑
o Fod), and (3)
a factor (φod) reflecting the effect of distance, often an exponential or power
function of geographical distance.
Fod = NoJdφod (1.10)
This specification suffers from two important problems. First, it only takes into
account the characteristics of the origin and destination region and ignores
the influence of third regions on the predicted flow between o and d. Second,
doubling the mass variables would quadruple the predicted flows in the system.
The doubly constrained spatial interaction model provides one way of dealing
with these concerns by adding two additional terms Qo and Rd to the gravity
equation. These terms constrain the model such that the predicted outflows
No =
∑
d Fod and inflows Jd =
∑
o Fod in every locality remain constant. It is
straightforward to show that the constraints hold when the gravity equation
and the two balancing factors are defined as follows:
Fod = NoJdQoRdφod
with Qo =
∑
d
JdRdφod
−1
and Rd =
∑
o
NoQoφod
−1
. (1.11)
Although Qo and Rd introduce the influence of third regions in the model in
an intuitively appealing way, it remains debated whether these factors do this
in a way which correctly reflects economic push and pull forces originating
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from third regions (see for example Fotheringham, 1983). In the end, their
aim and construction is to uphold the constraints, and nothing more. This
critique applies to our model and the trade-gravity literature as well. There
exist interesting other approaches such as the model of Alonso (1978) in which
the degree to which the flow totals are constant is flexible, with the models
(1.10) and (1.11) as two extreme special cases. With some exceptions (such
as Bröcker, 1989), the model of Alonso has largely been ignored in the trade-
gravity literature. In a way this is remarkable as it seems realistic that total trade
flows are not constant and would increase in response to trade liberalisation
(which should be reflected in border effect estimates).
The doubly constrained gravity model can be derived from entropy maximi-
sation (or information minimisation) as in A. G. Wilson (1967). Anas (1983)
provides a link between this doubly constrained gravity equation and a discrete
choice framework. We will refer to this model as Wilson’s doubly constrained
gravity equation A. G. Wilson (1967). Even though J. Anderson & Van Wincoop
(2003) do not explicitly refer to their model as being constrained, they (and we)
implicitly incorporate both a supply and a demand side constraint. A fundamen-
tal difference is that in our model the constraints pertain to monetary aggregates,
contrary to Wilson’s model, whose constraints pertain to aggregate commuter
flows. On the supply side, instead of constraining the total number of outgoing
commuters (the number of resident workers in a locality), we constrain the total
workers’ earnings in each locality to remain fixed. On the demand side, Wilson’s
model constrains the total number of incoming commuters (number of jobs),
whereas we constrain our model such that the outgoing wage payments in each
locality (the total wagebill) always equals their initially observed value. These
monetary constraints enter our model naturally through the derivation of the
labour demand framework by substituting for the local wage levels, wo, so that
our gravity equation captures differences in the local average productivity level
of workers, Ao. Our approach highlights that constraints don’t need pertain to
the unit of the dependent variable: despite the fact that we consider commuter
flows, from an economic perspective, it seems intuitive to keep the total costs
(wagebill) of the firm in any destination region fixed when considering changes
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in commuting costs, rather than the number of in-commuters.
The predictive ability of commuting models is traditionally judged on their
ability to replicate the trip distribution matrix with measures such as the root
mean squared error (RMSE) (see Knudsen & Fotheringham, 1986). Although the
focus of Wilson’s doubly-constrained model is on commuting flows and imposes
constraints in the unit of the dependent variable (total inflow and outflow of
workers), we show that the RMSE and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
of our model is actually smaller. This confirms our prior intuition that the
monetary constraints are a sensible choice in this context. In addition to a
superior model fit, monetary constraints are more appropriate to control for
the role of wages as a spatial equilibrating mechanism between local labour
markets as they take into account how firms value different workers and how
local labour productivity differences affect the spatial commuting patterns.
Failing to control for the local wage level can lead to biased estimates of the
border effect if spatial productivity is not randomly distributed with respect to
the border location.
1.3 Estimation strategy
A log-linearized version of the gravity equation (1.9) could be estimated by
OLS5. But as argued by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) this approach is problematic
for two reasons: first, Jensen’s inequality implies that, in the presence of het-
eroskedasticity, log-linear transformations will cause the error term to become
correlated with the covariates.6 Second, by log-transforming equation (1.9),
all observations with a commuter flow equal to zero drop out of the analysis.
This is the case for about 65 percent of all observations in our sample. This
5For an insightful discussion on the evolution of estimation techniques of gravity equations in
the trade literature, see Burger et al. (2009).
6Flowerdew & Aitkin (1982) describe how the expected value of the logarithm of a random
variable depends on its variance. So, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, where the variance
of the error term depends on the covariates, its logarithm depends on the regressors, hence
violating the consistency condition of OLS, leading to biased estimation. See also Silva &
Tenreyro (2006).
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type of censoring leads to sample selection bias. To overcome both problems,
we treat commuter flows as count data. Count models explicitly allow for zero
as a possible (and possibly likely) outcome and do not suffer from bias in the
presence of heteroskedasticity. We use a negative binomial model which allows
the variation of the count variable to exceed its mean (overdispersion).7
Assume that commuting costs are a log-linear function of geographical distance
(distod) and a dummy capturing the effect of regional borders (Bod), such that
τod = distod
α1 eα2Bod or lnτod = α1 ln distod +α2Bod . (1.12)
For within-locality commuting, the ‘internal distance’ distii is assumed to be
directly proportional to the square root of the area of each municipality, and
calculated according to the formula distii = (2/3)
p
areai/pi, as in Head & Mayer
(2000).
The stochastic negative binomial model for the gravity equation (1.9) is given
by:
Cod ∼ Poisson(exp(ηod + vod))
evod ∼ Gamma(1/γ,γ)
ηod = − ln Y T + ln Eo + ln Wd −σα1 ln distod −σα2Bod
+ lnΠ′o + lnΩ
′
d
(1.13)
where γ is the overdispersion parameter, Eo =
∑R
d=1τod Cod and Wd =
∑R
o=1 wod Cod .
The error term vod contains transitory shocks to bilateral commuting flows and
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors. Equation (1.13) is then
estimated and solved subject to the set of non-linear constraints (1.8) and
(1.7).
To solve this non-linear system of equations, we apply a nonlinear version
of the Gauss-Seidel method.8 Using some initial guess for the vector Π′o and
7The critique of Bosquet & Boulhol (2010) on the use of the negative binomial model does not
apply in this context as our dependent variable, the number of commuters, is scale independent.
8A similar method is also discussed in Head et al. (2013). For a more general description of
nonlinear Gauss-Seidel methods, see Vrahatis et al. (2003)
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the parameters α1 and α2 governing the commuting costs, we calculate a first
approximation for Ω′d . Using these values Ω
′
d , we in turn calculate an improved
guess for Π′o. Iteration proceeds between updating Ω
′
d and Π
′
o for given α1 and
α2 until convergence is achieved. Equation (1.13) is subsequently estimated
using maximum likelihood, providing updated values for the commuting costs
parameters α1 and α2, after which new values for Ω
′
d and Π
′
o are iteratively
calculated. This entire process is repeated until α1 and α2 converge. Since
σ cannot be identified without knowledge of the specific elements of τod , an
assumption on σ is required to calculate the MR-terms. The analysis proceeds
using σ = 2.9 As the MR-terms are stochastic in nature, we use a bootstrap
method to calculate standard errors on the coefficients in all tables using 200
replications.
The resulting coefficient on the border dummy −σα2 does not correspond to
the percentage change in commuting due to the presence of the border as in
a standard regression. The ceteris-paribus condition is violated because other
variables in the model change depending on the absence or presence of a border
(see J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra, 2004). Values for the
MR-terms have to be recalculated to conduct comparative static analyses. As in
J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003) we consider only the direct effect of varying
the border effect on Π′o and Ω
′
d and ignore changes in the shares eo and bd as
well as the mass variables.
Define the border effect Xod as the percentage difference between a commuter
flow Cod between two localities o and d which are separated by a border
(Bod = 1), and the commuter flow C∗od under the hypothetical scenario in which
the effect of a set of borders Bi j is set to zero. From equation (1.9) and (1.12)
it follows that
Xod =
Cod − C∗od
C∗od
=
(Π′oΩ
′
d)
(Π∗oΩ∗d)
e−σα2 − 1, (1.14)
where Π∗o and Ω
∗
d are the recalculated multilateral resistance terms, setting
9Varying the value of σ to other (extreme) values of sigma reported in the relevant literature,
leaves the results qualitatively unaltered. We refer to section 1.4.2 for a discussion of the
sensitivity of the border effect to the chosen value of σ.
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some Bi j = 0. Obviously, the border effect Xod is only defined for localities that
are separated by a border.
The fact that some of the explanatory variables in our estimation equation are
not deterministic implies that the regular standard errors of the coefficients may
be downward biased. All reported standard errors are therefore bootstrapped
using 200 replications, including those of derived statistics such as the border
effects reported in section 1.4.
1.4 The effect of regional borders on commuting
1.4.1 Data description
Highly disaggregated data on the number of daily commuters between 580
Belgian municipalities10 was obtained from the Belgian National Social Security
Office (NSSO) for the year 2008. This administrative source covers the total
Belgian population of payroll employment, but excludes the self-employed.
Seventy-six percent of the Belgian payroll workers work in a different munic-
ipality than the one they live in. Sixteen percent of them work in a different
NUTS1 region. Our unit of analysis is the number of commuters between
pairs of municipalities. Including within-municipality commuting flows, our
dataset consists of 336 400 datapoints (containing 3 274 709 workers). Of these
pairs 217 721 or about 65 percent do not have any commuting between them.
The largest (great-circle) distance one can travel (280km) within Belgium’s
boundaries is between the sea-side municipality of Koksijde and Aubange, a mu-
nicipality near the Luxembourgh border. The non-zero commuter flow covering
10Nine municipalities belonging to the small German speaking community of Belgium were
excluded from the analysis. This leaves 580 out of a total of 589 Belgian municipalities in
the sample. Estimating a separate border effect for this group would increase our number
of directional border effects from 9 to 16. At the same time, these additional border effects
would be exceedingly difficult to estimate given the small number of municipalities, the small
size of their labour markets and their remoteness from Flanders and Brussels. Moreover,
these German municipalities do not constitute a legal geographical entity with the same level
of competences as the Walloon, Flemish and Brussels regions.
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the largest great-circle distance runs between the municipalities of Koksijde and
Waimes, located 247km away from each other. Arguably, the relatively small
difference between the furthest non-zero commuter flow and the maximum
commutable distance implies that all our municipality pairs in the sample are
within a commutable distance from one another. The vast majority of commutes
takes place within much smaller distances: in our sample, the median commuter
bridges 9.3km and the average distance commuted is 21.3km. Seventy-five
percent of all commutes take place within 24km.
To analyze commuter flows, travel time is likely to be more relevant to com-
muters than simple great-circle distance, since it controls for factors such as
the quality of transport infrastructure. The analysis includes three different
measures of inter-municipality distance. A first proxy is the geographical dis-
tance (distod) between the town halls of both municipalities. Additionally, we
consider travel time by car (carod), obtained through the Google Maps API, and
travel time by public transport (pubtransod), obtained from the website of the
main Belgian train operator, NMBS.11
A substantial part (782 927 workers or 23.9 percent) of Belgian commutes takes
place within municipality borders. We proxy intra-municipality travel times
using the following methodology: first, a log-log specification is used to regress
travel time on distance using data on short-distance intermunicipality commut-
ing. This provides an estimate for the relationship between travel time and
distance. Using this relationship, the within-municipality travel times were then
predicted, starting from the internal distance measure distii = (2/3)
p
areai/pi.
The resulting average within-municipality commuting distance is 2.52km, with
an associated average commuting time of 17.8 minutes by public transportation
or 6.9 minutes by car. Our results do not change much when we use other prox-
ies for internal distance and travel time or simply exclude within-municipality
commuting from the analysis altogether.
The data also contains the average wage paid by the firms in a municipality. We
11Public transport times refers to the shortest travel time to get to the destination at 8.30am on a
Tuesday morning, combining all forms of public transport such as train, bus and underground.
The data on travel times reflect the situation in June 2011.
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use it to calculate the total wage bill in each municipality, which serves as the
mass variable of destination. The origin mass variable, in contrast, has to be
calculated iteratively in the estimation procedure as described in section 1.3.
1.4.2 Estimation results, base specification
This section proceeds with the estimation of the gravity equation represented
by equation (1.13). All the empirical specifications include an origin-specific
constant term for each of the three regions. This is equivalent to assuming
the commuting cost vector contains a region-of-origin specific component. An
alternative interpretation follows from the perspective of defining the desired
control group, since a separate constant term for each region controls for re-
gional differences in the average size of outgoing inter-municipality commuting
flows. By including origin-specific constant terms, we evaluate the size of cross-
border commuting flows by comparing them to commuting flows within the
same region-of-origin.
We first estimate the border effect using one single dummy variable that indicates
whether the commuter flow between two municipality pairs crosses one of the
regional borders between Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. This implies that
Table 1.1 assumes commuting costs to be symmetric for all border crossing.
Which border is crossed, or the direction wherein, is not taken into account. This
symmetry assumption will be relaxed later on. The border effects are reported
in the lower half of Table 1.1. They are calculated using the comparative
static formula (equation (1.14)), which compares the cross-border flows with
all borders intact, relative to the hypothetical cross border flows, where a
single border effect is set to zero (Bod = 0) in Π∗o and Ω
∗
d . The border effects
in Table 1.1 differ between border crossings only because of differences in
the counterfactual MR-terms. Column (1) of Table 1.1 shows the result of
estimating a specification which corresponds to model (1.13), except for the
fact that the coefficients on the variables are not constrained to their theoretical
values. Proxies for commuting costs are the geographic distance between the
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(1) (2) (3)
ln Eo 1.022
∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 1
(0.0267) (0.0174)
ln Wd 1.138
∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 1
(0.0192) (0.0194)
ln distod −1.951∗∗∗
(0.0280)
ln carod −2.663∗∗∗ −2.555∗∗∗
(0.0989) (0.117)
ln pubtransod −0.530∗∗∗ −0.679∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.132)
Bod −0.941∗∗∗ −0.547∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗
(0.0631) (0.0477) (0.0412)
lnΠ′o −0.856∗∗∗ −0.898∗∗∗ −1
(0.0625) (0.0367)
lnΩ′d −1.174∗∗∗ −1.150∗∗∗ −1
(0.204) (0.133)
Border effects, Xod
Xod(o ∈ FL, d ∈WL) −0.486∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0232) (0.0247)
Xod(o ∈ FL, d ∈ BR) −0.456∗∗∗ −0.301∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0221) (0.0233)
Xod(o ∈WL, d ∈ FL) −0.481∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0260) (0.0268)
Xod(o ∈WL, d ∈ BR) −0.518∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0235) (0.0250)
Xod(o ∈ BR, d ∈ FL) −0.559∗∗∗ −0.371∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0312) (0.0321)
Xod(o ∈ BR, d ∈WL) −0.588∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗ −0.371∗∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0267) (0.0288)
Measures of fit
RMSE 2474 1434 1023
AIC 2.437 2.346 2.359
N 336400 336400 336400
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.1: Estimating the gravity equation for commuting, with a single border-crossing
dummy Bod indicating any inter-regional border crossing. Column 1 controls for the
simple distance measure. Column 2 controls for the two commuting time measures.
Column 3 restricts the coefficients on the mass variables and MR-terms to 1 and -1,
respectively. The border specific estimates are calculated using the comparative static
formula (1.14). The notation Xod(o ∈ XX, d ∈ YY)od indicates the effect of the existence
of the regional border between region XX and YY on commuting between them. Note
that the border effects differ between border crossings only because of discrepancies in
the MR-terms.
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Ho Chi
2 p-value
βEo = 1 0.08 0.7716
βWd = 1 12.53 0.0004
βΠ′o = −1 6.22 0.0126
βΩ′d = −1 0.90 0.3421
Table 1.2: Results of 4 separate t-tests on the coefficient restrictions imposed by the
theory, for the estimation results of column 2 in Table 1.1.
town halls of both municipalities, ln distod and the border dummy, Bod . The
coefficients on the mass variables are estimated close to unity, as predicted
by theory. The coefficients on the MR terms deviate somewhat further from
their predicted value of -1, but are still within a reasonable range. The effect
of distance is clearly negative, as expected. The large and negative coefficient
on Bod shows that, after controlling for distance and the mass and multilateral
resistance of the origin and destination, regional borders act as a barrier to
commuters.
Column (2) replaces the simple distance measure by two distance variables
which are more relevant to commuters, travel time by car (carod) and public
transport (pubtransod). Both variables are included in logs. The time it takes
to commute between two municipalities by car is clearly the most important
determinant of the two. A 10 percent increase in travel time by car, reduces the
commuter flow by 27 percent, whereas for travel time by public transport, this is
only 5.3 percent. Comparing the results in column (1) to column (2) reveals that
after controlling for the two alternative distance measures, the absolute value
of the coefficient on the border dummy decreases. This means that part of the
regional border effect captured in column (1) can actually be explained by poor
interregional transport infrastructure connecting municipalities across regional
borders. In addition, the drop in the associated RMSE shows that the model’s
fit improves. To make the estimation fully consistent with theory, the coefficient
on the mass variables and MR terms should be equal to 1 and -1, respectively.
Table 1.2 shows the result of separate t-tests on the four coefficients estimated
in column (2) of Table 1.1. It cannot be rejected that the coefficients on the
origin’s mass variable and the destination’s MR-term equal their theoretically
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consistent values. For the other two coefficients, however, this hypothesis is
rejected. This is not entirely surprising, given the large sample size. As a
robustness check, we solved the model imposing all four restrictions (column
(3) of Table 1.1). The results remain qualitatively unchanged with a reduction
in the estimate of the coefficient on the border dummy from -0.547 to -0.432.
As in J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003), we need to assume a value for the
elasticity of substitution σ to solve our model. The results in Table 1.1 assume
an elasticity of substitution equal to 2. Whether this is a reasonable assumption
depends on the nature of the mechanism that is driving the firms’ spatial love-
of-variety. To the extent that the spatial substitution pattern of workers is driven
by differences in the average skill mix of municipalities, a well-chosen value of
σ should reflect the degree of substitutability between worker groups with a
different educational background. In this context, the relevant literature reports
values ranging from 1.1 to as much as 7.5 (see Card & Lemieux, 2001, in the
context of educational groups). Firms’ love of variety, as argued in section 1.2,
could also be driven by the intertemporal dynamics of the labour market, in
combination with heterogeneous workers characteristics/vacancy requirements.
In this context, we know of no studies that provide estimates of σ. A sensitivity
analysis (based on the unrestricted specification, reported in column (2) of
Table 1.1) shows that our main conclusions hold, regardless of the value of
σ.12 Solving the model with σ = 1.1, the lowest value reported by Card &
Lemieux (2001) results in a border coefficient of -0.534, only marginally lower
than -0.547. Increasing the elasticity of substitution to σ = 7.5 , results in a
border coefficient of -0.787. That the cost of the border increases as the spatial
substitutability of workers increases (ceteris paribus) is expected. We continue
our analysis with a value of 2, a value in the lower range of elasticities reported
in the literature, which provides a conservative estimate of the border effect.
12This is in line with the findings of J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003).
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(1) (2)
ln No 1.001
∗∗∗ 1
(0.0260)
ln Jd 1.003
∗∗∗ 1
(0.0151)
ln carod −2.465∗∗∗ −2.438∗∗∗
(0.0916) (0.124)
ln pubtransod −0.559∗∗∗ −0.732∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.135)
Bod −0.802∗∗∗ −0.827∗∗∗
(0.0532) (0.0677)
lnQo 0.659
∗∗∗ 1
(0.0394)
ln Od 0.705
∗∗∗ 1
(0.0632)
Measures of fit
RMSE 1720 3346
AIC 2.365 2.426
N 336400 336400
Bootstrapped standard errors ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.3: Wilson’s doubly-constrained model described by equation (1.11). Column
1: unrestricted estimation. Column 2: restricted estimation. The variables Qo and Rd
are the ‘balancing factors’, which correspond to J. Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003)’s
multilateral resistance terms Π′o and Ω′d .
1.4.3 Estimation results, comparison with doubly-constrained
model
Table 1.3 shows the results when estimating the classic doubly-constrained
model from equation (1.11). The specification is similar to the model presented
by equation (1.13), but instead of constraining the destination’s wagebill and
the origin’s total earning to their observed values, the total number of jobs and
total number of workers are constrained, respectively. Table 1.3 reports both
the unrestricted (column 1) and the restricted (column 2) version of the model.
Comparing the unrestricted models (column (2) Table 1.1 vs column (1) Table
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1.3) reveals that the results are quite similar, apart from the coefficient on the
border dummy whose absolute value is estimated at 0.802, substantially higher
in Wilson’s double-restricted model. As argued before, this could be caused by
failing to control for the role of wages in the gravity equation: if productivity
is not randomly distributed with respect to the location of regional borders,
this could lead to biased estimation of the border effect. Tables 1.1 and 1.3
also report the RMSE and the AIC to assess the fit of the models. The RMSE
reported for the restricted Wilson model (3346) is higher than the one for the
restricted specification in column (3) of Table 1.1 (1023), which suggests that
the CES-based model is better at predicting the observed commuting flows.
This conclusion carries over to the unrestricted models (column (3) of Table
1.1 versus column (2) of Table 1.3). Also using the AIC, the specifications in
Table 1.1 are preferred over the classic doubly constrained model, although the
difference is only minor between the unrestricted models.
1.4.4 Estimation results, relaxing assumptions on commut-
ing costs
Gravity equations (1), (2) and (3) in Table 1.1 are similar to those commonly
used in the context of international trade. We will now alter these specifications
to better match the specific features of a typical labour market.
Previously, the border effect was assumed to be homogeneous: it was equal for
all regional borders and independent from the direction in which those borders
were crossed. This assumption is untenable in the context of interregional
commuting. As an example, regional asymmetries in the knowledge of the
country’s other official language would lead to asymmetries in the effect of the
different border crossings. We therefore replace the single border dummy with 6
border indicators, one for each of the possible border crossings between the three
NUTS-1 level regions in Belgium. There might also be omitted region-specific
factors which affect commuting behaviour, such as regional culture, policy,
or differential preferences of commuters regarding modes of transportation.
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Failing to control for such factors will lead the coefficients on the directional
border crossing dummies to be biased as they will pick up this region-specific
distance-decay heterogeneity (see also Melo et al., 2011; Fotheringham, 1983,
for further discussion on spatial variation in the distance decay parameter). We
therefore introduce a second element of heterogeneity in the commuting cost
vector and allow the effect of travel time by car and train to differ between
regions. Table 1.4 presents the estimation results.
Column (1) again shows a specification where the coefficients on the mass
and MR variables are not constrained to their theoretically consistent value.
Colum (2) imposes these restrictions. All six border effects remain qualitatively
unchanged after imposing the restrictions. The results of the formal tests of
these restrictions are reported in table 1.5 and are similar to our findings in
table 1.2.
The bottom part of Table 1.4 reports the comparative statics (using equation
1.14). As before, we hypothetically remove each individual border separately.
The result reported for the Brussels-Flanders border crossing therefore corre-
sponds to the percentage change in commuting across the Brussels-Flanders
border in the case where only this specific border would be eliminated, but all
other borders would still be intact. As expected, allowing for differential coeffi-
cients on the respective border crossings increases the discrepancies between
the border effects substantially.
The results reveal that the averages reported in Table 1.1 were masking the
presence of both negative and positive border effects. Three of the border
crossings turn out to have a positive effect on interregional commuter flows,
but only the flows with destination Brussels are significantly different from zero.
Instead of being deterred, the commuters are actually attracted by the Brussels
Capital region. This positive border effect is likely to be caused by the special
capital status of the Brussels region. Since it is the public administrative centre
of Belgium, Brussels hosts a great deal of Belgian public employment: not only
the federal administrative institutions are located there, but also the Flemish
public administration is headquartered on Brussels territory. Arguably, there
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(1) (2)
ln Eo 1.024
∗∗∗ 1
(0.0152)
ln Wd 1.037
∗∗∗ 1
(0.0158)
ln carod × I(o ∈ BR) −2.296∗∗∗ −2.196∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.197)
ln carod × I(o ∈ FL) −2.799∗∗∗ −2.746∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.115)
ln carod × I(o ∈WL) −2.542∗∗∗ −2.464∗∗∗
(0.0826) (0.0895)
ln pubtransod × I(o ∈ BR) −0.471∗ −0.561∗
(0.220) (0.240)
ln pubtransod × I(o ∈ FL) −0.375∗∗∗ −0.436∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.114)
ln pubtransod × I(o ∈WL) −0.523∗∗∗ −0.627∗∗∗
(0.0824) (0.0909)
lnΠ′o −0.847∗∗∗ −1
(0.0287)
lnΩ′d −1.107∗∗∗ −1
(0.0890)
Estimates of the coefficients on the border dummies , Bod
Bod(o ∈ FL, d ∈WL) −0.472∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.110)
Bod(o ∈ FL, d ∈ BR) 0.306∗ 0.283∗∗
(0.133) (0.0910)
Bod(o ∈WL, d ∈ FL) −1.082∗∗∗ −1.035∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.0950)
Bod(o ∈WL, d ∈ BR) 0.319∗ 0.304∗∗
(0.155) (0.102)
Bod(o ∈ BR, d ∈ FL) −0.640∗ −0.621∗
(0.274) (0.264)
Bod(o ∈ BR, d ∈WL) 0.245 0.238
(0.273) (0.247)
Border effects, Xod
Xod(o ∈ FL, d ∈WL) −0.294∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗
(0.0637) (0.0577)
Xod(o ∈ FL, d ∈ BR) 0.229∗ 0.210∗∗
(0.108) (0.0740)
Xod(o ∈WL, d ∈ FL) −0.540∗∗∗ −0.524∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0322)
Xod(o ∈WL, d ∈ BR) 0.283 0.268∗∗
(0.156) (0.102)
Xod(o ∈ BR, d ∈ FL) −0.401∗∗ −0.392∗∗
(0.145) (0.140)
Xod(o ∈ BR, d ∈WL) 0.245 0.238
(0.360) (0.318)
Measures of fit
RMSE 574 458
AIC 2.320 2.320
N 336400 336400
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.4: Estimating the gravity equation for commuting, with a separate directional
border-crossing dummy for each regional-border crossing. Column 1: unrestricted
estimation. Column 2: restricted estimation. The dummy variables Bod(o ∈ xx, d ∈ yy)
indicate the respective directional interregional border crossings, where BR stands for
Brussels, FL for Flanders and WL for Wallonia.
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Ho Chi
2 p-value
βEo = 1 0.34 0.5585
βWd = 1 3.46 0.0628
βΠ′o = −1 21.48 0.0000
βΩ′d = −1 0.76 0.3827
Table 1.5: Results of the tests on the coefficient restrictions imposed by the theory.
The tests are based on the results of column 2 (Table 1.4)
could also be a prestige premium attached to working (or running a business)
in the capital region. In addition, the cultural divide between Brussels and
the other two regions is less likely to be an obstacle for incoming commuter
flows as its capital status and history causes the inhabitants of both regions to
feel connected to Brussels. Linguistic differences are also less of a concern for
this border crossing, since the bilingual status of Brussels implies both Dutch
and French speakers have many opportunities on the Brussels labour market.
This special role for Brussels in the Belgian interregional commuting flows was
already visible in Figure 1.2. Another possible cause of this positive border
effect would be a higher cost of living (including housing) in a city, forcing
workers to relocate in neighbouring regions and commute. Unfortunately our
current framework does not allow to consider residential choice. Although we
believe omitted housing prices may be important in explaining the positive
border effects towards Brussels, this is much less likely the case for the other
border crossings.
The positive border effect (24.8 percent) of the Brussels-Wallonia border might
appear to be contra-intuitive. Although the effect is insignificant, it suggests
that the commuter flows running from Brussels to Wallonia is found to be
larger than what would be expected based on observables such as distance or
commuting time. A possible explanation is the peculiar geography of Brussels as
a predominantly French-speaking enclave within Flanders territory with workers
from Brussels, predominantly French-speaking, having difficulties accessing
jobs requiring knowledge of Dutch in the surrounding Flemish municipalities.
The remaining three border are negative and were driving the negative homo-
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Brussels Flanders Wallonia
French 75% 95% 100%
Dutch 59% 100% 19%
French & Dutch 51% 57% 17%
Table 1.6: Language knowledge in Belgium (source: Ginsburgh & Weber, 2006)
geneous border effect. The border crossing from Wallonia to Flanders exerts
the largest negative effect and reduces commuter flows by 53.5 percent. The
reverse border crossing is somewhat smaller and amounts to -29.3 percent. Also
the Brussels-Flanders border crossing reduces commuter flows, by 39.7 percent.
Probable causes of these negative border effects are deficiencies in language
knowledge, the extent of which differs between regions. Table 1.6 provides
some insight into the language factor(see Ginsburgh & Weber, 2006). The data
confirm indeed that the knowledge of the second country language may be
driving the differential border effects. About 19 percent of Walloons consider
themselves proficient Dutch speakers, whereas the percentage of Flemish who
consider themselves proficient French speakers is 59 percent. Ironically, the
survey reveals that the percentage of bilingual speakers is higher in Flanders
than in the officially bilingual region of Brussels.
1.5 The effect of borders on wages
The local labor market equilibrium in our model depends on local supply and
demand, surrounding supply and demand, as well as the spatial structure of
commuting costs. The local equilibrium wage summarizes in one single value
the relative attractiveness of a municipality. Equation (1.4) provides us with an
explicit expression for the equilibrium wage in municipality o:
wo
Ao
=
 Eo∑R
d=1

τod
Ωd
(1−σ)
Wd

1
1−σ
.
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Through (1.4), we can graphically illustrate the equilibrium effect of borders.
It should be stressed that since we only take into account direct changes in
transport costs, our analysis is partial in nature. Consider a decrease in bilateral
commuting costs between o and other localities. The improvement in o’s
accessibility will increase the demand for its labour, putting an upward pressure
on the local wage wo. This effect will be more pronounced if o is surrounded
by municipalities with strong labour demand. We have shown how regional
borders impose spatial rigidities, so removing them will change the spatial
pattern of commuting costs. This will impact the spatial attractiveness of all
locations and therefore alter the local equilibrium wage levels. From equation
(1.4) follows straightforwardly that the change in the local equilibrium wage
wo can be written as:
w∗o −wo
wo
=
∑Rd=1 τ∗odΩ∗d (1−σ) Wd∑R
d=1

τod
Ωd
(1−σ)
Wd

1
σ−1
− 1, (1.15)
where τ∗od represents the adjusted commuting cost vector where some border
effects are eliminated.
Figure 1.3 plots the percentage increase in the equilibrium wages wo under the
hypothetical scenario in which borders would have no impact on commuting.
It applies the estimation results of column (3) in table 1.5 to equation (1.15),
with all the border effects in commuting cost vector τ∗ set to zero. The pattern
that emerges coincides with our prior expectations, and a number of interesting
conclusions can be drawn. The results confirm the findings of table 1.5. The
map shows significant regional heterogeneity in the impact on the local wage.
The impact of removing the borders is felt strongest in the Walloon municipal-
ities and ranges from 3 percent to as much as 33 percent. For Flanders, the
average impact is much smaller: the estimated increase in wo ranges from 0.4
percent to 7.2 percent for most municipalities. From a demand perspective, the
elimination of the borders will increase wages in all regions, as decreasing costs
raises demand for cross border workers. Since the WL⇒FL border effect was
stronger than the FL⇒WL border effect, this increase will be more pronounced
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0,4% - 2,9%
3% - 7,2%
7,3% - 12,2%
12,3% - 17,3%
17,4% - 33%
Figure 1.3: The predicted wage-effect of removing regional borders.
in the Wallonian region. This differential effect is enhanced by the fact that
employment opportunities are on average relatively abundant in the Flemish
municipalities.
Perhaps most interesting is the spatial pattern that emerges within the regions.
Municipalities nearby the border are obviously most affected by the spatial
border rigidities. But the effect is not uniform across all border municipalities.
To illustrate more clearly the within-region heterogeneity in the impact of the
border effect, figure 1.4 decomposes the Flanders-Wallonia regional border
result into two distinct directional effects.
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WL & BR
0% - 3%
3,1% - 4,4%
4,5% - 6,6%
6,7% - 10,6%
(a) The effect of eliminating the FL-WL border on Flemish municipalities
VL & BR
1,1% - 14,7%
14,8% - 17,6%
17,7% - 22,5%
22,6% - 37,5%
(b) The effect of eliminating the WL-FL border on Walloon municipalities
Figure 1.4: Directional border effects and municipal equilibrium wages
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The upper panel of 1.4 shows the impact of eliminating the FL-WL border on
equilibrium municipality wages in Flanders. In the province of Limburg, in the
east of Flanders, the wage impact of the border removal infiltrates deep into
the hinterland. For the province of West-Flanders, in the west, this is not the
case and the effect attenuates rapidly with distance from the border. Compared
to Limburg, which has a history of heavy industry and mining activities, em-
ployment opportunities are relatively abundant in West-Flanders (Torfs, 2008).
Figure 1.4b shows how the effect of removing the WL-FL border carries deep
into the Walloon hinterland, all the way up through the province of Hainaut up
to the French border. The industrial economic structure of Hainaut has never
fully recovered from the adverse shocks resulting from the seventies’ oil crises.
Its proximity to the prosperous province of West-Flanders further adds to the
already pronounced effect. The part of Wallonia south of Brussels is less affected
by the removal of the border effects, as it has markedly better employment
opportunities, both locally and in nearby Brussels. Comparing figure 1.1 with
figure 1.3 shows that the model is able to replicate existing unemployment
patterns. In a way, this is remarkable since it only takes into account the distribu-
tion of economic activity and does not consider unemployment levels explicitly.
In conclusion, the wage exercise nicely illustrates the spatial structure of the
cost imposed by regional borders and the driving mechanisms of the model.
Unfortunately, its the partial equilibrium structure enders it inappropriate for a
fully fledged welfare analysis.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we derived a gravity equation for commuting from a simple
spatial labour market model and used it to identify the deterrent effect of
regional borders on commuting flows. The model assumes that firms produce
with a love of variety for workers from different locations. We see our model
as a reduced form of more complex labour market models with heterogeneous
labour markets. Our approach builds on the work of J. Anderson & Van Wincoop
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(2003), who propose a similar model to explain international trade flows.
The development of gravity equations in the trade literature have taken place
largely parallel to the development of gravity equations in spatial interaction
modelling. Interestingly, our gravity equation, based on the J. Anderson &
Van Wincoop (2003) trade model, shows some important similarities with the
doubly constrained gravity equation, a workhorse model developed by A. Wilson
(2010). We took this model as a benchmark to test the performance of our
gravity equation and showed that our approach is superior in terms of predictive
power and fit. We also argued that the control variables derived from our labour
demand model are more appropriate in light of the identification of the border
effect.
The gravity equation was estimated using a Belgian dataset on commuter flows
between 580 Belgian municipalities. Belgium is an interesting country for
the study of regional borders and their effect on commuting, as the country
is multi-regional and multi-lingual, and even a casual look at the pattern of
commuting flows reveals interesting regional patterns. We find a significant
and large deterrent effect of regional borders on the size of inter-municipality
commuting flows. The analysis further revealed that the border effect is highly
dependent on which border is crossed, and even in which direction. This
asymmetry suggests there is scope for region-specific policies that encourage
interregional commuting to increase regional labour market integration. The
border-removal exercise illustrated the impact of border-related spatial frictions
on the local equilibrium wage and suggested that spatial imperfections caused
by regional borders could could imply significant welfare losses, in particular
in depressed localities located close to potential employment opportunities in
a neighbouring region. To unveil and quantify the extent to which different
possible causes contribute to the border effects, and their regional differences,
has to be left as an interesting venue for further research.
Chapter 2
Scale Effects in the Labour Market:
A Survey of the literature
2.1 Introduction
This chapter surveys the literature on scale effects in the labour market. Labour
market scale effects or labour market pooling externalities were listed by (Mar-
shall, 1890) as one of three sources driving spatial concentration of economic
activity.1 Labour market scale effects or labour market pooling externalities are
efficiency gains that are rooted in the spatial concentration of labour market
agents and serve as a popular explanation for the existence of cities. They arise if
spatial proximity facilitates the interaction between actors on the labour market
and renders labour market mechanisms more efficient. In his ground breaking
manuscript Principles of Economics, Marshall (1890) discussed at length the
productivity benefits associated with spatial agglomeration of industries. Many
of his observations related to the functioning of the labour market:
1The other two being input sharing and knowledge spillovers
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“Again, in all but the earliest stages of economic development a localized
industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a constant
market for skill. [...] Employers are apt to resort to any place where
they are likely to find a good choice of workers with the special skill
which they require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places
where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs and where
therefore it is likely to find a good market.”
– Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics
The effect of spatial proximity on labour market efficiency can manifest itself
through a variety of channels. Most of Marshall’s observations relate to the
process through which firms and workers meet and match. Scale effects can
impact labour market matching at the extensive margin. If more labour market
agents are actively searching for a partner in a given space, it is not unimaginable
that the probability of finding a suitable match increases. Then scale is said
to influence matching quantity. Scale effects can also impact matching at the
intensive margin. A large labour pool makes it easier for firms to find the
‘right man for the job’, in particular in industries where complex production
processes require a specialised set of skills. So scale can also influence matching
quality. Marshall further describes a more subtle driver of labour market pooling
externalities, noting that large labour pools offer ‘a constant market for skills’.
Large labour market shelter individual firms and workers from idiosyncratic
shocks, as scale irons out their impact on aggregate wage fluctuations. Scale
lets workers and firms share risk.
By describing the mechanisms through which scale could enhance the efficiency
of local labour markets, Marshall pioneered a vast literature on urban agglom-
eration economies, which has been covered by a number of excellent survey
papers. Duranton & Puga (2004) provide an excellent discussion of several
theoretical micro-foundation of agglomeration economies. They classify them
according to the driving mechanisms behind agglomeration externalities and
distinguish between three different categories: learning, sharing and matching.
Enrico (2011) provides an elaborate exposition about local labour markets
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in equilibrium, which includes a discussion on the effects of agglomeration.
Rosenthal & Strange (2004) discuss both scope and sources of agglomeration
externalities, but only briefly cover the topic of labour market pooling. Puga
(2010) follow the classification proposed by Duranton & Puga (2004) and link it
with a selection of empirical studies. They conclude that empirical evidence of
matching is still lacking. More recently, Combes & Gobillon (2014) addressed
this void with a survey on the empirics of agglomeration.
This paper adds to this literature a survey that is entirely dedicated to the
discussion of scale effects in the labour market. It is specifically aimed at
strengthening the link between theory and empirics. The exposition is structured
around three main sections. The first two deal with the efficiency of the labour
market matching process and discuss the relationship between labour market
scale on the one hand, and matching quantity and quality on the other. The
third section covers the risk-sharing aspect of labour market pooling.
2.2 Labour market scale & Matching quantity
2.2.1 Random search and the aggregate matching function
Labour market scale can speed up the rate at which agents meet and match. A
popular tool for testing for scale effects in the matching rate is the empirical
matching function, a concept grounded in the work of Nobel price winners
Diamond (1982b); Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). In the Diamond,
Mortensen and Pissarides-model (DMP hereafter), labour market are char-
acterised by search frictions, arising from different sources, like worker and
firm heterogeneity, imperfect information or costs of transportation (Pissarides,
2011). An aggregate matching function summarises the complex labour market
search process by relating the number of matches Mr that form over a certain
period in a certain region r to the number of open vacancies Vr and individuals
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searching for a job Ur:
Mr = Ar M (vr Vr , ur Ur , X r) = Ar (vr Vr)
α (ur Ur)
β X γr , (2.1)
where Ar measures the efficiency of overall matching process and X r is a vector
of control variables affecting the matching rate.2 The supplementary terms ur
and vr are agents’ search intensities, so that the combined terms vr Vr and ur Ur
are to be interpreted in terms of efficiency units.
The matching function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, α,β > 0.
This means that for a given number of searchers on one side of the market, a new
searching entrant on the opposite side will increase their chances of locating a
partner (thick market externality). If α−1,β−1< 0, an additional searcher on
a given side of the market will reduce the probability of locating a partner for all
its competitors (congestion externality). If the number of searchers on both sides
of the market increases and both effects cancel each other out, the probability
of matching remains constant regardless of the number of actively searching
agents. The search technology is then said to be characterised by constant
returns to scale (CRS) (α + β = 1), which is often interpreted as evidence
against matching-related labour market pooling externalities. Search related
scale effects in the labour market would imply that an increase in the number
of unmatched agents leads to a disproportionate increase in the number of
matches. This idea certainly has intuitive appeal. One would reasonably expect
that, within a given area, search grows more efficient with the number of labour
market participants actively engaged in search activities. This should then
be reflected in the estimates of the coefficients on vacancies and unemployed
workers, with an estimated scale elasticity larger than one, α+ β > 1.3
Empirically estimating the returns to scale coefficient is interesting in its own
right, but it also has theoretical relevance. Diamond (1982a) for example, shows
that an increasing returns to scale (IRS) matching process gives rise to multiple
2Time subscript were omitted for the sake of notation.
3That does not necessarily need to be the case for scale effects to exist is discussed at length in
section 2.3
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equilibria. In response to search being more efficient in large markets, agents
could reduce their search efforts without affecting their matching probability.
On the other hand, the thick market externalities could induce them so search
harder, to fully reap the benefits of the scale effects, open up the possibility
of two equilibria: one with low search effort and high unemployment, and
one with high search effort and low unemployment (Petrongolo & Pissarides,
2001). To avoid the complexity of dual equilibria, macro-economic models often
maintain the assumption of CRS for reasons of tractability. However, correctly
modelling the scale coefficient of the matching function is important since it
has non-trivial implications for policy, as it will affect for example the optimal
unemployment benefit scheme (Schuster, 2012). Fortunately, M. Ellison et al.
(2014) argue that the conditions required for equilibrium stability with an IRS
matching function are more straightforward than is often assumed and simply
requires that there are decreasing return to vacancy creation.
2.2.2 Empirical estimates of the scale elasticity
A constant returns to scale matching function is often taken as some kind of
empirical regularity. Although the empirical literature does provide a substan-
tial amount of evidence on CRS,4 a non-negligible number of studies reports
significant evidence of IRS in the matching process. An overview of these studies
will provide a better understanding of what causes some studies to reject CRS
in favour of IRS.
First, evidence on IRS seems to be more common in studies that estimate the
matching function using a trans-log (TL) specification. Guilkey et al. (1983)
show that a TL function is most suitable to provide consistent estimates of the
returns to scale parameter, which could explain why a considerable amount
of empirical studies reports evidence on IRS. Warren (1996) estimates an
aggregate matching function for the United States and finds a scale coefficient of
1.332, indicating significant IRS effects. Yashiv (2000) estimates a TL matching
4see for example Petrongolo (2001) for an explicit test of the CRS-hypothesis and Petrongolo &
Pissarides (2001) for an overview.
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Geo Freq Time εα+β
Translog specification
Kangasharju et al. (2005) Finland monthly ’91-’02 1.1-1.6
Warren (1996) US monthly ’69-’73 1.31
Yashiv (2000) Israel monthly ’75-’89 1.3
Inclusion employed search
Baker et al. (1996) Canada monthly ’87-’88 1.546
Broersma & Van Ours (1999) Netherlands quarterly ’88-’94 1.30
Jolivet (2009) U.S. monthly ’03-’06 1.114
Aggregation issues
P. M. Anderson & Burgess (2000) U.S. monthly ’78-’84 1.515- 1.541
Fahr & Sunde (2001) West-Germany yearly ’80-’95 1.206
Ibourk et al. (2004) France monthly ’90-’95 n/a
Ilmakunnas & Pesola (2003) Finland yearly ’88-’97 1.164-1.324
Profit & Sperlich (2004) Czech Republic monthly ’92-’96 n/a
Table 2.1: Empirical evidence on increasing returns to scale in the aggregate matching
function
function for the Israeli labour market and finds convincing evidence for IRS,
with scale elasticities in a similar range as those reported by Warren (1996).
Kangasharju et al. (2005) explicitly compare a Cobb-Douglas (CD) to a TL
specification. While they fail to reject the hypothesis of CRS for the CD function,
the TL version exhibits IRS. The scale elasticity varies between 1.1 and 1.6.
Second, misspecification of the matching function can cause the scale coefficient
to be underestimated. Baker et al. (1996) and Broersma & Van Ours (1999)
stress the importance of having a correct correspondence between the flow
variable on the left-hand side (matches) and the stock variable on the right-hand
side (job searchers). For example, if on-the-job search is relatively important
in the matching process, omitting them from the stock of job searchers will
underestimate the true returns to scale in the matching process. Baker et al.
(1996) finds increasing returns in the matching process on the Canadian labour
market. They report a scale elasticity of 1.4. Broersma & Van Ours (1999)
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find a scale elasticity of 1.3 for the Netherlands. Although Jolivet (2009) does
not find significant scale effects, he does show how ignoring on-the-job search
downward biases the scale coefficient.
A third argument is put forward by Coles & Smith (1996), who link the common
finding of CRS in the matching function to data aggregation issues. They
argue that when spatial aggregation exceeds the geographical level relevant for
local labour markets, returns to scale estimates are biased towards CRS. The
intuition is simple: duplicating entirely segregated markets N times will lead
the matching rate to increase by a factor N. Their spatial example carries over
straightforwardly to other dimensions of aggregation, at the level of occupation
or education, for example. In Blanchard et al. (1989), Robert Hall provides
a similar argument: even if cross-sectional estimates exhibit constant returns
to scale, there might still be scale effects for highly specialized workers. Coles
& Smith (1996) test their hypothesis of spatial aggregation bias by estimating
cross-sectional matching functions for the United Kingdom at the level of Travel-
To-Work-Areas, which are considered to be functional labour markets. While
they fail to reject the CRS hypothesis, they do find a positive effect of density
on the matching rate, indicating that spatial concentration is not irrelevant
in the matching process. Other studies based on disaggregated data did find
evidence for IRS. P. M. Anderson & Burgess (2000) use a panel of state-level
unemployment and vacancy data for the United States. Depending on the
specification of the regression equation, the regional matching functions are
found to exhibit IRS. Ilmakunnas & Pesola (2003) estimate a fixed effects model
on a disaggregated panel of regional vacancy and unemployment data for
Finland. Their reported scale coefficient varies between 1.32 and 1.6. Similarly,
Munich et al. (1999) and Ibourk et al. (2004) both find IRS using spatially
disaggregated data. Fahr & Sunde (2001) find evidence for IRS in the West-
German matching process by estimating occupation-specific matching functions.
Significant scale effects are found for crafts and technical occupations. Burdett
et al. (1994) show how temporal aggregation can lead to downward biased
estimation of the scale coefficient, if vacancies and unemployment follow a
mean reverting process.
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Other studies have examined the impact of agglomeration on efficiency of the
matching process through the efficiency term Ar in equation (2.1). Hynninen
& Lahtonen (2007) compare Ar across regions, controlling for differences in
job seekers’ heterogeneity and find that density increases matching efficiency.
Ibourk et al. (2004), for France, also find positive effects of density on the rate
of matching, as well as Gan & Li (2004), who report similar evidence for the
academic job market. Di Addario (2011) is able to isolate the effect of changes
in search intensity ur from the impact of labour market density. The distinction
is important because it is not unlikely that job search behaviour differs in dense
regions. For example, if a worker is located in a dense labour market where
job-search is more efficient, he can adjust his search effort accordingly. Then the
effects of density on search efficiency are clouded by the downward adjustment
of search intensity. Or maybe urban dwellers, facing tougher competition,
intensify their job search activities. Di Addario (2011) uses the Italian Labor
Force Survey micro-data to distinguish between these two factors. She finds
that search intensity does not seem to be affected by density and the job finding
rate is significantly higher in agglomerated regions. This indicates that higher
urban matching efficiency is driven by scale effects, rather than changes in
searchers’ behaviour.
In sum, the empirical literature provides a mixed picture on the existence of
scale effects in the labour market. I covered three explanations that address the
observation that a lot of studies fail to find evidence for IRS in the aggregate
matching function. They were of methodological nature and mostly related
to misspecification or measurement issues. Even if evidence of scale effects
is uncovered, the black-box nature of the matching function does not provide
any insight into the mechanisms that are driving these scale effects. A num-
ber of studies have attempted to model the micro-foundation underlying the
aggregate matching function. In spite the inconclusive evidence on the scale
coefficient, most micro-foundations aim to replicate an aggregate matching
function characterised by CRS (see for example Lagos, 2000; Shimer, 2007;
Stevens, 2007; Ebrahimy & Shimer, 2010). Section 2.2.3 considers some of the
models that have been proposed in the literature that attempt to micro-found
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an aggregate matching function characterised by IRS.
2.2.3 Micro-foundations for a DMP IRS matching function
Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2005) model informal job search channels, where
employed workers who run into information about open vacancies disseminate
this throughout their social network. They argue that the scale of one’s social
network has an ambiguous effect on the probability of matching. On the
one hand, larger networks facilitate the dissemination of information on job
opportunities. On the other hand, workers fail to coordinate their job search
efforts. This increase the probability that information about a certain vacancy is
passed on to multiple job-searchers. Beyond a certain threshold, the congestion
effects start to dominate. So even though their resulting aggregate matching
function implies IRS, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the size of
the network and the job-finding probability. Cahuc & Fontaine (2009) build
further on this topic and discuss the stability and efficiency of the possible
equilibria in a model with job search behaviour and social networks. They show
how a decentralized equilibrium can be inefficient, leaving room for conditional
unemployment benefits to improve upon welfare.
The importance of social networks in job-search behaviour has been confirmed
regularly in the empirical literature. Wahba & Zenou (2005) examine the
transmission of job information through social networks using the Egypt Labor
Market Survey. They find a strong link between density and the probability that
informal contacts were a central aspect of the job search strategy. In addition,
the probability of getting a job through friends or family declines once the size of
the local network surpasses a certain threshold, which is in line with the theory
of Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2005). Based on US employer-employee data,
Schmutte (2015) also shows the importance of local networks in job search
behaviour. His analysis shows that the labour market outcome of individuals
depends on the job fortunes of their neighbours. Hawranek & Schanne (2014)
analyze the relationship between referral effects and residential location for
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the Rhine-Ruhr urban area in Germany. They find that the probability of two
individuals working together increases substantially if they live in the same
neighbourhood. The relevance of social network in workers’ search strategy
has been confirmed by a considerable amount of empirical studies, providing
support for the modelling mechanism used in Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2005)
that led to the aggregate IRS matching function.
Lester (2010) also micro-founds an aggregate matching function characterized
by IRS. He develops a directed search model in which firms post wages and
workers, being faced with coordination frictions, adjust their search strategy
accordingly. In his model, workers decide which jobs to apply for. While doing
so, they face a trade-off between a high-paying position and a large number of
competing applicants on the one hand, or a modest salary but less competitors
on the other. Offering high wages might be costly to firms, but it attracts
more potential candidates. This increases the possibility of finding a suitable
candidate. Crucially, the author distinguishes between vacancy creation along
the extensive and intensive margin, as firms can decide whether to create one
(extensive margin) either two (intensive margin) vacancies. Scale effects enter
the model through the intensive margin. When firms decide to open multiple
vacancies, matches increase not only because of the mere opening of new
vacancies, but also because the matching process becomes more efficient. The
reason why this is the case is intuitive. Workers do not coordinate their search
actions so whenever there is more than one firm offering a vacancy, there will
always exist some probability that one firm receives no applicants (see also
Hawkins, 2013, who argues that labour market become ‘less stochastic’ for larger
firms). If in the limit all vacancies are posted by one single firms, coordination
frictions disappear and the search process become perfectly efficient. His model
is consistent with the observation that large firms are more actively creating jobs
in expansions while small firms create more jobs in recessions. Lester (2010)’s
micro-foundations therefore provide an explanation why the efficiency of the
matching process is often found to be pro-cyclical (Klinger & Rothe, 2012).
Similarly, given that firms are larger in agglomerated areas (Manning, 2010),
his model can explain why the efficiency of the matching function is positively
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related to the density of economic activity (see Hynninen & Lahtonen, 2007;
Di Addario, 2011, among others).
2.2.4 The stock-flow approach to matching
Coles & Smith (1998) propose an alternative matching mechanism, consistent
with the notion of labour market scale effects. They model the labour market as
if it were a market place, so matching is no longer random. Worker heterogeneity
is not explicitly modeled, but rather implicitly assumed, as was the case in the
standard DPM-model.5 Contrary to the DMP-framework, all information about
unmatched workers and firms is centralized in a trading place, so that search is
no longer costly. In each period, agents entering into the pool of unmatched
agents immediately observe all their potential partners. If there is a suitable
partner, they immediately match and exit their unmatched state. This process
is called stock-flow matching, as in each period the only matches that occur are
among unmatched agents and new entrants. If a worker exits employment and
does not immediately find a new match, he enters into the unemployment pool
and has to wait for a new vacancy to open up with which he is able to form
a viable match. The stock-flow framework is consistent with the observation
of long-term unemployment spells and vacancies that are difficult to fill. To
see how scale effects enter the model, say there are Vr t open vacancies and Ur t
unemployed in region r at the beginning of time period t and new vacancies
and unemployed arrive at rate ρU and ρV respectively. If a worker enters
the unemployment pool, he will consider all open vacancies available at that
time. With probability p he matches with a specific vacancy, so that the chance
of finding at least one suitable match among the stock of open vacancies is
1− (1− p)Vr t . Symmetry on the demand side of the labour market results in
the following reduced form matching function:
Mr t = ρU[1− (1− p)Vr t ] +ρV [1− (1− p)Ur t ]. (2.2)
5Depending on what are considered the source of the frictions.
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The intuition behind the scale effects in equation (2.2) is relatively straight-
forward: the larger the pool of unmatched potential partners in the trading
place, the lower the probability that none of them is a viable match. So treat-
ing local labour markets as isolated market places, stock-flow type matchings
mechanisms result in labour market pooling externalities.
Coles & Smith (1998)’s stock-flow idea has been tested a number of times,
mostly confirming that stock-flow matching is an important mechanism in the
labour market. Coles & Smith (1998) themselves confirm the relevance of the
stock-flow mechanism as they find that new inflows of vacancies become more
important, the longer a worker is unemployed. Coles & Petrongolo (2008)
compare a stock-flow to a random matching specification. They conclude that
outside of steady state, the data is best described by a stock-flow mechanism.
Other comparative studies include Sasaki (2008), who finds evidence for both
random matching and stock flow matching on the Japanese labour market, and
Forslund & Johansson (2007) who shows that Swedish data favour a stock-flow
mechanism. Andrews et al. (2013) tests the stock-flow mechanism using micro-
level data to find that the inflow of new vacancies has a significant effect on the
probability of escaping unemployment. In line with the stock-flow intuition,
new vacancies have a stronger impact on the matching probability than the size
of the existing vacancy stock.
2.3 Labour market scale & Matching quality
The idea that labour market scale facilitates matching has been discussed at
length in section 2.2. Empirical evidence on the returns to scale of the aggregate
matching function is mixed and more often than not the hypothesis of CRS can
not be rejected. This had let some authors to suggest that the effect of labour
market scale manifests itself in the quality of matching, rather than the quantity.
The idea that some matches are better than others incorporates the notion of
heterogeneous labour market agents. The abilities and qualifications of workers
vary substantially, as is the case for the skill-requirements of firms. This makes
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that some firm-worker pairs are meant to be, while others might not. Worker
heterogeneity takes a central place in theories dealing with matching quality.
Agent heterogeneity is generally modelled in two different ways. When agent
quality can not be ranked, heterogeneity is said to be non-hierarchical (section
2.3.1). In models that assume hierarchical heterogeneity (section 2.3.2) agent
heterogeneity is interpreted in terms of skill (workers) or productivity (firms),
which makes a ranking of agents possible. In sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, I will
discuss the link between scale and matching quality. Wherever possible, the
theories are linked to existing empirical evidence, to assess the extent to which
their unique predictions or modelling mechanisms have received empirical
support. It is not my intention to fully describe the equilibrium properties of
the model, but rather to emphasize which modelling features give rise to labour
market pooling externalities.
2.3.1 Non-hierarchical heterogeneity
Typically, non-hierarchical models do not rely directly on an IRS matching
technology to introduce scale effects. Helsley & Strange (1990) for example
use a Salop (1979) type mechanisms, which they apply to an urban labour
market context.6 Salop (1979) models heterogeneity in the context of monopo-
listic competition in the product market. Helsley & Strange (1990) apply this
approach to a labour market context. Workers and firms are ex-ante heteroge-
neous and posses a differentiated set of skills, y and x . Agent randomly draw
their type from a uniform unit-circle distribution. Output q(x , y) can only be
produced in pairs and the return of a match depends on its productivity. The
smaller the distance |x − y| between both agents’ skill set, the more productive
the match. The skill distance between the firm and the worker can therefore be
interpreted as the cost of training required to align the worker’s skills to those
6A similar approach was followed by Gan & Zhang (2006); Kim (1990, 1991); Brueckner et al.
(2002); Amiti & Pissarides (2005); Moen & Yashiv (2014), among others.
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required by the firm. Production then proceeds using the following technology:
q(x , Y ) = αΩ(x)− β∑
Y (x)
|x − y|, (2.3)
where α is a measure of worker productivity and Ω(x) is the number of workers
employed by a firm. Firms produce with a fixed cost of production C and wages
are determined through a split-the-difference bargaining process, so that wages
and profits are given by:
w(x , Y ) =
1
2
(α− β |x − y|) (2.4)
pi(C , x , y) =
1
2
 
αΩ(x)− β∑
Y (x)
|x − y|
!
− C , (2.5)
Imperfect information is an essential driving force of the scale effects in Helsley
& Strange (1990)’s model. Workers first need to decide where to locate. When
choosing location, agents face uncertainty about the skill sets of potential local
partners. They only have information on their numbers. Scale effects arise
here because when facing uncertainty, locating in dense markets minimizes the
expected skill-distance between a firm and a worker, which in turn maximizes
the return to matching. The drivers of IRS in this model therefore show up in
the expected return function for workers and firms:
E[w] =
1
2

α− β
4m

(2.6)
E[pi] =
n
2m
−

α− β
4m

− C , (2.7)
where m denote the number of firms in a city. From equations (2.6) and (2.7)
it is easy to see that firm profits and worker wages are a function of local
labour market scale: an increase in the number of firms results in a better
match between workers’ skills and jobs’ requirements, leading to a positive
relation between scale on the one hand, and productivity and wages on the
other. The relation between productivity and city scale has been researched
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intensely and has been confirmed numerous times. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to cover this empirical literature extensively, but a notable example
is the study of Henderson (2003). Perhaps more relevant in the context of
labour market externalities is the city-size wage premium, the existence of
which has been documented repeatedly. Wheaton & Lewis (2002) for example,
find that industries or occupations that are clustered offer an wage premium
between 1.2 and 3.6 percent . Yankow (2006) finds an urban wage premium of
19 percent, one third of which can be attributed to agglomeration effects. He
further distinguishes between an urban wage growth and wage level effect. A
wage level effect implies that workers experience an immediate wage increase
when relocating to a city. A wage growth effect implies that a worker’s wage
does not rise immediately, rather the pace at which is grows picks up.
Labour market pooling externalities are not the exclusive driver of urban pro-
ductivity gains and the urban wage premium, as they can be attributed as well
to most other agglomeration theories.7 To assess the relevance of Helsley &
Strange (1990)’s model, we turn to their driving agglomeration force, which
relates city size to matching quality. Abel & Deitz (2015) explicitly test the
hypothesis that labour market scale has a positive effect on match quality using
a sample of college graduates in the United States. They construct a proxy
that measures how well individuals’ reported qualifications match their current
occupation. In line with Helsley & Strange (1990), their concept of mismatch
is ‘horizontal’ by nature, as they look at the college major in which a worker
graduated, rather than the level or length of education. They find that college
graduates in larger and thicker labour markets are more likely to hold a job
that is related to their skill set. They also find better matched workers earn
higher wages. Using Italian survey data Andini et al. (2013) test a wide range
of hypotheses related to labour market pooling externalities, among which
the positive relationship between urban scale and matching quality. They find
that employers in dense markets report less difficulty finding suitable vacancy
candidates.8 In sum, Helsley & Strange (1990)’s model receives substantial em-
7Often referred to as ‘Marshallian equivalence’.
8Other attempts at quantifying the relationship between scale and the quality of matching were
undertaken by Berlingieri (2014) and Boualam (2014).
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pirical support, as several studies report a positive relationship between labour
market scale and match quality. However, Helsley & Strange (1990)’s model
is only consistent with a level-effect in wages. Since it is lacking a dynamic
dimension, it cannot explain the wage growth effect. Papageorgiou (2014)
addresses this void by introducing dynamics in a Helsley & Strange (1990)-type
model. Workers learn their occupation-specific productivity productivity only
gradually over time, on-the-job. Finding the right occupation is easier in cities
which host a wide variety of occupations, typically large cities.
A number of empirical studies have examined the relationship between urban
scale, worker mobility and match quality. If workers are on average better
matched in large labour market, one would expect they switch jobs less frequent
than workers in peripheral areas. Bleakley & Lin (2012) indeed shows that
on average workers switch occupations less often in thick markets. But they
also show that the opposite holds true for younger workers, for whom the
relationship between scale and occupational switches is positive. Wheeler
(2008) also finds weak evidence that workers in dense areas are less likely to
switch industries. Moreover, this relationship is conditional on the number of
prior job switches a worker experienced. For workers who have held multiple
jobs, the likelihood of changing industries decreases with the scale and diversity
of the local market. Wheeler (2008)’s findings indicate that for early-career
workers the former effect dominates, as first job changes occur more frequently
in big cities. For more experienced job-hoppers, the latter effect starts to
dominate. Both studies nevertheless point towards the importance of the
relationship between scale effects, diversity and the job matching process.
Wheeler (2006) concludes that "an important aspect of ‘learning’ in cities may
involve individuals learning about what they do well".
2.3.2 Hierarchical heterogeneity
In contrast to non-hierarchical models, agents in hierarchical models can be
ranked from low to high. Vertical differentiation implies that agents differ in
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terms of productivity. Urban scale in models with hierarchical heterogeneity
improves matching quality through strengthening the degree of assortative
matching. Assortative matching originated from the seminal work of Becker
(1973), who developed a neo-classical assignment model and show that in
a world where heterogeneous agents are complementary in production, the
equilibrium assignment will be characterised by perfect positive assortative
matching (PAM). Complementarity implies that the marginal product of the
partner’s type is an increasing function of one’s own type. Imagine a world in
which agents meet randomly. Upon meeting, they can decide to either match
and produce or remain unmatched and continue searching. In the absence
of search costs9, no agent would be willing to match with a lower type, since
he would be able to increase his pay-off by continuing his search for a better
partner. In equilibrium, this leads to a situation where all production pairs
are made up of agents with identical skills. This result breaks down if one
departs from the neoclassical assumption that search is costless. After meeting
a lower type partner, agents face a trade-off between a lower productivity level
associated with forming a match with a lower type and incurring the cost of
continued search. In equilibrium, costly search induces agents to match with
suboptimal partners and perfect PAM no longer holds (Shimer & Smith, 2000).
Wheeler (2001) applies the idea of assortative matching in an urban context. In
his model, workers and firms search for appropriate matches in cities where scale
is negatively related to the cost of search. Types are hierarchically heterogeneous
and complementary in production. The scale effects in the model are formalized
by assuming firms pay some fixed search costs C which allows them to invite and
meet a certain number of workers, who arrive at rate λ(n), so that search costs
per ‘interviewed’ worker c(n) = C/λ(n) decrease in city size. The combination
of complementarities in production and search costs result in a cut-off quality
under which the firm is not willing to match with the workers and instead
prefers to incur the cost associated with further search. The lower the cost of
search, the closer will be the cut-off level to the firm’s own quality. So, firms
9And all agents would meet all other agents instantaneously, so that there is no cost of foregone
production.
56 2.3. Labour market scale & Matching quality
become more selective in larger markets,10 which leads the strength of PAM to
be higher in dense regions. The predictions of his model are consistent with
the Marshallian idea of labour market pooling, as wages, productivity and the
return to skill are all increasing in city size. Additionally, his model predicts
that wage inequality is higher in cities.
Where Wheeler (2001) models the dependence of search costs on market
size explicitly, Teulings & Gautier (2004) achieve a similar result by using
an IRS contact technology. Their approach builds on the seminal work of
Shimer & Smith (2000), who introduce search frictions in the neo-classical
assignment model of Becker (1973). As in Wheeler (2001), firms and workers
are complementary in production and the decision to match is based on a trade-
off between search costs and reduced productivity due to mismatch. Meetings
are governed by a quadratic contact technology, which is the driving force of
Marshallian labour market pooling effects in this model: urban scale increase
the probability of meeting potential partners, thereby lowering search costs.
Gautier & Teulings (2009) introduce an IRS contact technology in a system of
cities, which allows them to explain urban inequality.
To validate the relevance of the drivers of scale effect in the Wheeler (2001) and
Teulings & Gautier (2004) model, one should look for evidence relating labour
market density to the strength of PAM. To measure the strength of sorting,
worker and firm quality need to be identified. J. M. Abowd & Kramarz (1999)
propose the use of Mincer wage equations supplemented with firm and workers
fixed effect. By calculating pairwise correlations using the estimates of the
fixed effects, they construct a measure of matching quality. Following this
approach, Andersson et al. (2007) analyse the effect of density on the strength
of assortative matching. Even though they fail to find convincing evidence of
positive assortative matching, they report a significant positive effect of density
on their proxy for matching quality. Eeckhout & Kircher (2011) argue that
10Wheeler (2001)’s mechanism also entails a congestion effect: bigger cities make search more
complex. Intuitively, the effect of n on the costs of meeting all workers nc(n) is ambiguous.
On the one hand, search costs per worker decrease. On the other hand, there are more
workers to meet. Wheeler (2001) assumes the former effect dominates the latter.
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the fixed effects method of J. M. Abowd & Kramarz (1999) cannot be used to
identify sorting. Lopes de Melo (2009) proposes an alternative wage based
proxy for matching quality, where worker quality is proxied by their average
wage over the sample period, and firm quality is proxied by the average wage of
their workforce. Torfs & Zhao (2011) use this measure and provide evidence for
labour market scale effects in Belgium. They show that labour market density
positively affects matching quality, although in the presence of mobility costs
this holds only for high ability workers who are able to self-select themselves
into the most agglomerated area. Ehrl (2014) identifies firm quality using a
TFP measure, while worker fixed effects are identified using the standard wage
function approach. He finds a positive, but non-linear, effect of density on the
strength of assortative matching.
2.4 Labour market scale & Risk-sharing
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 linked labour market pooling to the process of matching.
This section elaborates on a different mechanism, one that -unsurprisingly-
dates back to Marshall (1890). Marshall observed that cities ‘offer a constant
market for skill’, so that large labour pools can mitigate individual risk and
act as an insurance device against idiosyncratic shocks. This idea was later
formalized by Krugman (1991).11 To illustrate the risk-sharing mechanisms,
this section will elaborate on the model’s key equations.
Firm i’s profits Πi, given some employment level Li, are given by:
Πi = (A+ εi)Li − 12γ(Li)
2 −wLi, (2.8)
where A is a general productivity parameter and γ measures the extent of
decreasing returns to labour in the production technology. A crucial element of
equation (2.8) is the firm-specific stochastic productivity factor εi, with support
[−ε,ε], distributed with a variance σ2 around mean zero. Firms pay workers
11See also Duranton & Puga (2004) for a discussion of this model.
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their marginal product wi, which they take as given and adjust Li accordingly,
given the realization of the productivity factor εi. N firms then generate total
employment L:
L =
N∑
i
Li =
β −w+∑i εi
γ
. (2.9)
Expected wages follow straightforwardly:
E(w) = β − γ L
N
, (2.10)
as do expected profits,
E(Π) =
[β − E(w)]2 + var[εi −w]
2γ
, (2.11)
which combined, result in the final expression for firm profits:
E(Π) =
γ
2

L
N
2 var(εi) + var(w)− 2cov(εi, w)
2γ
=
γ
2

L
N
2
+

1− 1
N

σ
2γ
.
Based on equation (2.12), it is easy to see how labour market pooling exter-
nalities enter into the model. First observe that profits are a convex function
of the realization of the stochastic productivity factor εi, as well as of wages,
but that profits decrease in the covariance between the idiosyncratic shock and
wages. The basic intuition here is that when firms are subject to idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, they prefer locations with a large pool of other firms. This
dampens the effect of idiosyncratic shocks on local wages, since a single firm
expanding employment will not have a strong impact on the local wage level.
The mechanisms underlying the risk-sharing argument of Krugman (1991) have
received some direct empirical support from the literature. Overman & Puga
(2010) looks at the relationship between industry concentration and a measure
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of labour market pooling. Their labour market pooling measure builds on the
theoretical model of Krugman (1991) and it measures the idiosyncratic employ-
ment volatility faced by individual firms within a given industry, measured by
firm-level employment growth deviations from industry employment growth.
They relate it to the G. Ellison & Glaeser (1999) agglomeration measure of in-
dustry concentration and find that sectors experiencing more firm-idiosyncratic
employment volatility are more spatially concentrated. Heuermann (2008) tests
Krugman (1991)’s notion of risk sharing for Germany, but fails to find strong evi-
dence that industries whose firms are prone to idiosyncratic shocks are spatially
concentrated. However, they do find that industry concentration mitigates the
effect of idiosyncratic employment shocks on wages. The latter two findings are
in line with the Krugman (1991) risk-sharing theory of labour pooling. G. El-
lison et al. (2010) investigate the determinants of co-agglomeration patterns
and show how industries that use a similar type of labour pool tend to locate
together. While their study does not provide an insight into the mechanisms
driving location decisions, their conclusions are consistent with the theory of
risk-sharing. Similar evidence has been provided by Gabe & Abel (2010), who
examines co-agglomeration patterns of occupations to find that occupations
that are often used by the same industry tend to locate near to each other.
2.5 Conclusion
The body of literature on Marshallian agglomeration externalities has been
rapidly expanding over the past two decades. Marshall (1890) identified
three distinct sources of labour market externalities: input sharing, knowl-
edge spillovers and labour market pooling. This chapter focussed on the latter
category and discussed some of the theories that explain concentration of
economic activity through the presence of scale effects in the labour market.
The discussion was structured along three main categories: matching quan-
tity, matching quality and risk-sharing. Two of them relate to the process that
governs match formation on the labour market. Scale effects in the labour
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market can lead to an increase in the rate at which firms and workers form
matches. A positive relationship between matching quantity and labour market
scale can be pragmatically modelled through the use of an aggregate matching
function, linking job searchers and vacancies in a given labour market to the
number or realized matches or matching rate. Whether the matching process
is characterised by increasing returns to scale can be tested for empirically,
by estimating the scale elasticity of aggregate matching functions. Empirical
evidence for IRS is mixed. A number of reasons as to why this might be the
case were discussed. Apart from some methodological issues, it is plausible
that larger labour markets might not lead to more matches, but rather im-
prove the matching quality. Section 2.3 discussed a selection of models in
which larger labour markets improve the quality of matches between firms
and workers. I distinguished between models that assume hierarchical and
non-hierarchical heterogeneity of workers and firms. Finally, 2.4 discusses the
Marshallian argument of risk-sharing, a theory later formalized by Krugman
(1991) which says that firm locate in agglomerated areas to smoothen out the
effect of idiosyncratic labour demand shocks on local wages.
Throughout the survey, I attempted to link the theories to existing empirical
evidence. Marshallian equivalence, which implies that predictions of labour
market pooling models are indistinguishable from the predictions of other
agglomeration theories renders this a particularly daunting task. Therefore,
attention went out not only empirical support for the predictions, but also
for the mechanisms modelled to generate labour market pooling effects. The
literature provides compelling evidence for labour market pooling as a driving
source of agglomeration.
Chapter 3
Urban Labour Market Pooling,
Sorting and Mobility Costs
3.1 Introduction
Although labour markets function more efficiently at larger scales,1 a number
of empirical studies have found that urban scale does not come to the benefit of
all workers. Gould (2007) for example, shows that the urban wage premium is
more pronounced for high-skilled workers and Möller & Haas (2003) fail to find
any evidence for a low-skilled urban wage premium. In Bacolod et al. (2008)
cities only increase wages of workers with cognitive skills. This chapter offers
one explanation why low-skilled workers in urban areas do not enjoy labour
market pooling benefits to the same extent as their highly skilled peers. We
use an urban framework with two employment centres, search frictions on the
labour market and mobility costs, and enrich it with two-sided heterogeneity on
the labour market, skill complementarities in production, scale effects. We show
that peripheral low-skilled workers that reside in the vicinity of agglomerated
areas suffer twice. First, mobility costs restrict their job-search radius and
excludes them from the agglomerative benefits of dense urban areas. Second,
1For an overview, see chapter 2.
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because firms increasingly locate in agglomerated areas to reap the benefits of
the concentration of job search activities, at the expense of the periphery. This
novel finding has non-trivial policy implications, as it suggests that mobility
subsidies might not be Pareto welfare improving.
Our spatial set-up consists of an urban area with two districts2, which exoge-
nously differ in the scale of their labour market. Workers’ residential location is
assumed to be fixed,3 but firm location is endogenously determined by a free
entry condition. Workers are free to search for jobs in either or both areas.
Their optimal search strategy takes into account that commuting to the ‘for-
eign’ district is associated with a mobility cost, assumed to be fixed and equal
across workers. The matching process on the labour market is described by
an assignment mechanism subject to search frictions (Shimer & Smith, 2000),
where heterogeneous workers and firms search for partners with whom to
produce. Skills are complements in productions. This implies that the benefits
of matching with a better agent increase with skill type. Consequently, ‘birds of
a feather, flock together’ and low type workers match with low quality firms
and high type workers match with high quality firms. This is referred to in the
literature as positive assortative matching (PAM). In a labour market with search
frictions, PAM is not perfect and agents will settle with a suboptimal partner.
Scale effects in the labour market are an important driver of the main results of
this chapter. Labour market pooling as a source of agglomeration was already
acknowledged by Marshall (1890) in the late nineteenth century. In his ground-
braking manuscript Principle of Economics, he identified it as one of the three
sources of agglomeration externalities. An important mechanism driving labour
market pooling externalities is the process through which workers and firms
meet and match. The idea that search grows more efficient with the number
of labour market participants actively engaged in search activities certainly
holds intuitive appeal and has received considerable support in the empirical
2The core-periphery structure of the model can be interpreted in the spirit of the urban eco-
nomics literature, which often distinguishes between a Central Business District (CBD) and a
SuBurban District (SBD).
3An assumption that will be relaxes in the appendix of this chapter.
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literature (see chapter 2). Therefore, labour markets in this paper are subject
to scale effects, which are introduced by means of an increasing returns to scale
(IRS) contact technology (Teulings & Gautier, 2004). Agents will therefore find
it easier to meet a suitable partner in larger labour markets.
Skill complementarities in production imply that the return to a better match
is increasing in skill-type. The fixed cost of commuting will therefore give
rise to a situation where only the high-skilled find it optimal to search and
match in the agglomerated district. Peripheral workers at the bottom of the
skill distribution will opt to search locally. Surprisingly, locating in the relative
vicinity of large agglomerated areas deteriorates the labour market outcome
of the least productive workers, as vacancy creation shifts from the peripheral
to the agglomerated areas, to take advantage of the scale benefits associated
with labour market density. We take our model to the data using a linked
employer-employee dataset provided by the Belgian Crossroads Bank for Social
Security, and we are able to confirm its predictions.
The remainder of the text is structured as follows: section 3.2 outlines the
theoretical model and illustrates its equilibrium. Section 3.3 describes the data
which is used for the empirical strategy elaborated in section 3.4. Results are
reported in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Environment
General Structure
Figure 3.1 illustrates the general structure of the urban economy considered in
this chapter. The urban area consists of two districts, A and B, which differ in the
size of their labour force, so that LA > LB. In continuous time, heterogeneous
agents search for partners in a labour market with search frictions. Production
proceeds in pairs and is characterised by skill complementarity. All agents
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are infinitely lived and discount the future at a common rate r > 0. Contacts
between firms4 and workers are governed by a random contact technology. The
search process is time-consuming but subject to increasing returns to scale,
making search more efficient in district A. Workers in each district are free
to look for jobs in either or both districts, but inter-district job search is less
efficient than local search. In addition, workers who accept a job outside their
residential district have to pay a fixed commuting cost. Upon meeting, workers
and firms are given the choice between producing or continued search. This
decision is based on a comparison between their part of the match surplus
and their reservation value. A worker’s reservation wage is district-specific
and a function of the local contact rate and possibly also commuting costs. An
optimal search strategy will concentrate all search efforts in the area associated
with the highest reservation wage. The number of vacancies in each district is
determined by a free entry condition. Since labour markets are the focus of the
analysis, we do not model the goods market explicitly.
Labour market agents
Both sides of the labour market are populated by a continuum of agents, whose
types are assumed to be log-normally distributed:
log s ∼ N(µs,σs)
log p ∼ N(µp,σp),
with density l(s) for workers of skill type s and density g(p) for firms with
productivity p. Let ui and vi be the total number of unemployed workers and
vacancies per unit of labour supply Li in district i. Workers supply one unit of
labour and each firm has one vacancy on offer. ui(s) = ui l(s) and vi(s) = vi g(p)
are the densities of unemployed workers s and vacancies p per unit of labour
supply Li in district i. The total number of unemployed per skill type and
vacancies per productivity level in each district are denoted by ui(s)Li and
4In the remainder of this chapter, firms, jobs and vacancies are used interchangeably and refer
to the same concept.
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the urban economy
vi(s)Li, respectively. The unemployment rate for workers of skill type s then
becomes ui(s)l(s) . Similarly, the vacancy rate at productivity level p is
vi(p)
g(p) .
Unemployed workers maximise their expected present value of payoffs Ui(s),
while vacancies in district j maximise their expected present value of payoffs
Vi(p). While unmatched, workers get unemployment benefits U0 and vacancies
receive nothing. Firms pay an irreversible investment fE before entering the
market. Upon entry, firms learn their productivity, which is drawn from a
common distribution. The supply of vacancies in each district is determined by
a free entry condition. Wages are set through Nash-bargaining as in Pissarides
(1990), with 0< θ < 1 being workers’ bargaining power.
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Production
Pairs of firms and workers produce output using production technology f (s, p):
f (s, p) = sp. (3.1)
The production function is supermodular (see Lu & Mc-Afee, 1996; Teulings &
Gautier, 2004), which implies it is characterised by skill complementarities in
production. Under supermodular production, the marginal product of an agent
is increasing in the type of his partner:
f (s, p)− f (s, p′)> f (s′, p)− f (s′, p′),∀s > s′, p > p′ (3.2)
or in words: the benefits of matching with a more productive firms grow larger,
the higher the skill level of a worker. Skill complementarities are essential to
the model because they have important implications for partner choice.5
Job-search technology
Each worker allocates one unit of time to job search in either or both districts.
Let t i(s) and [1− t i(s)] denote the time worker s in district i devotes to job
search in districts i and j, respectively. Contacts occur randomly and there is
no on-the-job search. For each type pair (s, p) there are Mi[u(s), v(p)] contacts.
Searching for jobs in the ‘foreign’ district is more time-consuming than searching
for jobs locally. In addition, information dissemination of job opportunities
could attenuate strongly with distance.6 Therefore, inter-district search is less
efficient than local search. This is implemented through the search efficiency
indicator 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1. Over a given time interval, total contacts between job
5Note that if 3.2 holds, rearranging gives f (s, p) + f (s′, p′)> f (s′, p) + f (s, p′), which means
that total output is maximised under perfect sorting. Milgrom & Roberts (1990) provide an
in-depth discussion on supermodular functions and their properties.
6see for example, Schmutte (2015), where information depends on the size of a worker’s local
network.
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seekers of type s and vacancies of type p in districts A and B are then given by:
MA[u(s), v(p)] =

tA(s)uA(s)LA +ψ[1− tB(s)]uB(s)LB

vA(p)LA
MB[u(s), v(p)] =

tB(s)uB(s)LB +ψ[1− tA(s)]uA(s)LA

vB(p)LB
(3.3)
The terms in large brackets represent the total number of unemployed job
seekers of a given skill level s, measured in efficiency units, in the respective
districts. In district A there are tA(s)uA(s)LA resident workers with skill level s
searching for jobs locally. In addition, [1− tB(s)]uB(s)LB workers from B focus
their search efforts in A. Their number gets discounted by a factor ψ to account
for the lower inter-district search efficiency. The second term of the contact
function, vA(p)LA, measures the total number of vacancies in A. Residence is
predetermined and workers search for jobs from their home district. In Section
A.1.1, we will relax this assumption and allow for migration.
The functional form of the contact function follows Teulings & Gautier (2004),
who provide a number of arguments in favour of a quadratic contact technol-
ogy. That the empirical literature often finds constant returns to scale in the
matching process (for an overview, see Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001), does not
necessarily contradict this assumption. As argued by Petrongolo & Pissarides
(2006), contacts should be distinguished from actual matches. If there are scale
effects to search, the greater efficiency of the search process could make firms
and workers more selective in their partner choice. Scale effects would then
show up in the wage distribution, rather than in the matching rates.7
The implied contact rates are:
ρiis→p = t i(s)vi(p)Li
ρiip→s = t i(s)ui(s)Li
ρi js→p =ψ[1− t i(s)]v j(p)L j
ρi jp→s =ψ[1− t i(s)]ui(s)Li,
(3.4)
7Teulings & Gautier (2004)’s model simulations point out that the scale coefficient of the
matching function implied by their model reduces to 1.66. While this still significantly exceeds
1, there are several empirical studies that report empirical matching functions with elasticities
in the same range. For an overview, see chapter 2, section 2.2.2.
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where the first subscript of ρ denotes the location of workers and the second
subscript refers to the location of firms. For example, ρABs→p denotes the rate
at which unemployed workers of type s living in district A run into district
B’s p-type vacancies. The contact rates are subject to scale effects, a direct
consequence of the quadratic contact technology. Independent of location,
matches are destroyed randomly and exogenously at rate δ > 0. When a match
is destroyed, worker and firm re-enter the pool of searchers.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
After a firm and a worker make contact, matches are formed upon mutual
agreement. For worker s in district i, the matching set ωi j(s) is a time-invariant
set of firms in district j, with which she is willing to match and vice versa.
Symmetrically, ωi j(p) is the matching set of firm p located in district i, for
workers from j.
Steady state flows
In steady state, flows in and out of unemployment balance. For district A,
the flow into unemployment is described by the density of employed work-
ers, lA(s)− uA(s), whose matches exogenously dissolve at Poisson rate δ. The
flow of district A’s resident workers escaping unemployment is described by
uA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
ρAAs→pdp+uA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
ρABs→pdp, of which uA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
ρAAs→pdp find
a job locally, and uA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
ρABs→pdp match with a vacancy from district B.
Taken together, this gives the steady state condition, with the inflow into unem-
ployment on the left-hand side and the outflow on the right-hand side:
δ[lA(s)− uA(s)] = uA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
ρAAs→pdp + uA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
ρABs→pdp
= tA(s)LAuA(s)
∫
ωAA(s)
vA(p)dp +ψ[1− tA(s)]LBuA(s)
∫
ωAB(s)
vB(p)dp
(3.5)
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Unemployment value
Ui(s) is a worker s’s expected value of being unemployed and searching for
a job while living in district i. When she matches with firm p in district j,
she receives Wi j(s|p), with i, j = A, B, so that Si j(s|p) = Wi j(s|p)− Ui(s) is her
matching surplus. While unmatched, she gets unemployment benefits U0. At
flow rate tA(s)LA
∫
ωAA(s)
vA(p)dp she meets and matches with some p ∈ωAA(s)
in A and enjoys a gain SAA(s|p), while at flow rate ψ(1− tA(s))LB
∫
ωAB(s)
vB(p)dp
she meets and matches with some p ∈ωAB(s) in B and enjoys a gain SAB(s|p).
So, the value of search for a worker s living in district A is given by the following
Bellman equation:
rUA(s) = U0 + max
tA(s)∈[0,1]

tA(s)LA
∫
ωAA(s)
SAA(s|p)vA(p)dp
+ [1− tA(s)]ψLB
∫
ωAB(s)
SAB(s|p)vB(p)dp

,
(3.6)
where r is the discount rate.
Spatial search strategy
To maximise Ui(s), an unemployed worker allocates her job-search time t i(s) =
1 optimally between districts. Equation (3.6) implies that a worker from A
searches jobs locally (tA = 1) if her value from being unmatched while searching
in A weakly exceeds her value while searching in B. Otherwise, she focuses her
job search efforts entirely in district B. So we have that although unemployed
workers can freely distribute their time endowment between districts, search
activities are spatially concentrated, tA(s) ∈ {0, 1}:
tA(s) =
¨
1 if µLA
∫
ωAA(s)
SAA(s|p)vA(p)dp ≥ψµLB
∫
ωAB(s)
SAB(s|p)vB(p)dp
0 otherwise.
(3.7)
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Vacancy value
The value of a vacancy p in district A is written as follows:
rVA(p) = LA
∫
ωAA(p)
tA(s)SAA(p|s)uA(s)ds+ψLB
∫
ωBA(p)
(1− tB(s))SBA(p|s)uB(s)ds.
(3.8)
At flow rate LA
∫
ωAA(p)
tA(s)uA(s)ds a firm p in district A meets and matches with
some s ∈ωAA(p) from district A and enjoys a gain SAA(p|s), while at flow rate
ψLB
∫
ωBA(p)
(1− tB(s))uB(s)ds it meets and matches with some s ∈ωBA(p) from
B and enjoys a gain SBA(p|s).
Prior to entry, the expected net value of a vacancy in district A is VA− fE. The
expected net value is driven down to zero by unrestricted entry of new vacancies.
This yields the equilibrium free entry condition:
VA =
∫
VA(p)g(p)dp = fE. (3.9)
Match surplus & matching set
While matched, a worker s from district i gets payoff pii j(s|p) when matched
with firm p in district j, while the firm gets pii j(p|s). The pay-offs are subject
to the resource constraint pii j(s|p) +pii j(p|s)≡ f (s, p). At rate δ, the match is
destroyed and the worker suffers a loss Si j(s|p). Then the value of district i’s
resident worker s matched with a local firm p is written as:
rWii(s|p) = piii(s|p)−δSii(s|p). (3.10)
Workers living in district i that accept a job in district j 6= i pay T C commuting
costs,8 so their match value becomes:
rWi j(s|p) = pii j(s|p)− T C −δSi j(s|p). (3.11)
8Within-district commuting is assumed to be costless.
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While matched, wages are set according to a simple Nash bargaining solution
with θ being the worker’s bargaining power. From the bargaining problem’s
first order condition, we have that:
(1− θ )[Wi j(s|p)− Ui(s)] = θ[Ji j(p|s)− Vj(p)], (3.12)
where Ji j(p|s) is the present value for firm p in district j while matched with
worker s from i. Using Equation (3.10), (3.11) and the resource constraint, we
obtain the surplus of workers and firms:
Sii(s|p) = θ

f (s, p)− rUi(s)− rVi(p)
r +δ

Sii(p|s) = (1− θ )

f (s, p)− rUi(s)− rVi(p)
r +δ

Si j(s|p) = θ

f (s, p)− rUi(s)− rVj(p)− T C
r +δ

Si j(p|s) = (1− θ )

f (s, p)− rUi(s)− rVj(p)− T C
r +δ

.
(3.13)
Personal surplus is the bargained share of excess matching output over the
sum of unmatched values, in addition to the commuting cost in case of an
inter-district match. Surplus gets discounted by the sum of the interest and
destruction rate.
In equilibrium, an agent’s optimal strategy is to accept any match that weakly
exceeds her expected present unmatched value:
Si j(s|p)≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p ∈ωi j(s)
Si j(p|s)≥ 0 ⇐⇒ s ∈ωi j(p).
(3.14)
Thus, the matching sets are
SAA(s, p) = f (s, p)−wA(s)−λA(p)≥ 0⇔ p ∈ωAA(s)⇔ s ∈ωAA(p)
SAB(s, p) = f (s, p)−wA(s)−λB(p)− T C ≥ 0⇔ p ∈ωAB(s)⇔ s ∈ωAB(p),
(3.15)
where wi(s) ≡ rUi(s) is the average present value of an unmatched worker
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s, which is equivalent to his reservation wage. λi(p) ≡ rVi(p) is the average
present value of an unmatched vacancy p. Si j(s, p) is the match surplus.
Substituting (3.13) into (3.6), we obtain agents’ value functions:
wA(s) =U0 + max
tA(s)∈{0,1}

tA(s)θ
µLA
(r +δ)
∫
ωAA(s)
[ f (s, p)−wA(s)−λA(p)]vA(p)dp+
[1− tA(s)]θ ψµLB(r +δ)
∫
ωAB(s)
[ f (s, p)−wA(s)−λB(p)− T C]vB(p)dp

(3.16)
λA(p) =(1− θ ) µLA(r +δ)
∫
ωAA(p)
[ f (s, p)−wA(s)−λA(p)]tA(s)uA(s)ds+
(1− θ ) ψµLB
(r +δ)
∫
ωBA(p)
[ f (s, p)−wB(s)−λA(p)− T C][1− tB(s)]uB(s)ds
(3.17)
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (3.16) is the expected value
of a worker’s share of the match surplus in district A and the third term is the
expected surplus in B. Equation (3.16) implies that in equilibrium the expected
surplus of matching is equal to the opportunity cost of search.
Definition 1. A search equilibrium is characterised by a septuple (w,λ, V,ω, u, v, t),
where w and λ solve the value equation system (3.16) - (3.17) given (ω, u, v, t); V
solves the free entry condition (3.9) given (w,λ,ω, u, t),ω is the matching set given
w and λ based on (3.15), u solves the steady state equation (3.5) given (ω, v, t)
and t is the optimal spatial allocation of search time (3.7) given (w,λ,ω, v).
Because the wage function w(x) is not available, solving the model analytically
is impossible.9 To get to a numerical solution, we proceed as follows: First,
we divide the type space into 300 discrete categories. Second, we guess initial
values for all endogenous objects and subsequently run through the following
steps:
9Shimer & Smith (2000) provide a proof of existence of the equilibrium, while Teulings &
Gautier (2004) apply a second-order Taylor expansion to characterize the equilibrium.
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Step 1) Calculate the associated steady state unemployment rates using (3.5),
the value functions using (3.16)-(3.17), the allocation of search time
using (3.7) and a new matching set using (3.15).
Step 2) Repeat process (i) until the matching set remains unchanged.
Step 3) Calculate the expected firm profit using (3.9). If expected profits are
larger than the sunk entry cost of a vacancy, open more vacancies and
repeat step (i), (ii) and (iii) until the expected value of vacancies and
the sunk entry costs equalize.
3.2.3 Illustration of the equilibrium
Worker and firm types are log-normally distributed along an interval [1, 4].
The mean µs,p = 0.693 and standard deviation σs,p = 0.27 are chosen so that
95 percent of types lie within the interval’s boundaries. The other parameters
in the model are set as follows: the discount rate r is normalized to 1, the
exogenous destroy rate δ = 2r, labour market sizes LA = 4LB = 2000r, worker’s
bargaining power θ = 0.5, commuting costs T C = 0.4, unemployment benefits
U0 = 0.4 and the sunk entry cost fE = 1.8. To test whether the results are
sensitive to the choice of parameters, we selected a ±25% range around the
chosen values and took 1 000 random draws from the joint set of parameters.
In addition, we experimented with the initial values. The results remained
qualitatively unaffected.
Skill complementarities in production have important implications for the
sorting of worker and firm types. In a frictionless world, no agent would be
willing to match with a lower agent type. This is driven by the assumption of
supermodularity of the production process. In equilibrium, perfect assortative
matching is an optimum and all agents match with an identical partner. This
result breaks down when search becomes costly. Agents will widen their set of
acceptable partners, as they face a trade-off between suboptimal production and
the cost of prolonged search. The width of that set measures the match quality.
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The narrower is the matching set, the higher is the match quality. To provide
a benchmark and get a feel for the model’s mechanisms, we first discuss the
equilibrium where inter-district job search is prohibitively inefficient (ψ= 0)
so that the labour market in both districts operate in autarky.
Equilibrium without inter-district job search
Scale effects in search drive a wedge between the match quality in district A
and district B. The first panel of Figure 3.2 illustrates how this gets reflected in
the matching sets. The light-shaded area represents A’s matching set, which
is significantly more narrow than the matching set of B, represented by the
shaded area as a whole. The bands are upward sloping because production
complementarities induce positive assortative matching. The widening of the
bands for higher skill-types is driven by the log-normal assumption of the
type distribution. It implies relatively few high-type agents are searching for
partners, which widens their matching set as they become less picky in their
partner choice. The upper right panel compares reservation wages of workers
in both districts. The reservation wage is higher in the large district for all skill
types since the expected value of search is higher. That the difference grows
larger for high type agents is a direct consequence of skill complementarities in
production, which implies high types have more to gain from finding a better
partner. This result will be of central importance to the commuting decision
of workers (see section 3.2.3). The bottom left panel presents the values of
vacancies in district A and B. Interestingly, the expected value of low type
vacancies is marginally higher in B than it is in A, as the lower contact rate in B
forces high type workers to accept a lower type vacancy. Higher up the type
distribution however, the value of vacancies increases significantly stronger
in A than in B. The bottom right panel illustrates the unemployment rate by
worker types. District A’s unemployment rate is lower across all skill levels. The
difference is particularly large for low-skilled workers as they are more likely
to be rejected by highly productive firms. Note how unemployment increases
marginally for the highest worker types. This is because the opportunity costs
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium without inter-district job search ψ= 0
of matching with lower type agents becomes so high, that some of them prefer
to remain unmatched.
Inter-district job-search
The commuting decision of workers is based on a comparison between the value
of search (equation 3.7) in both districts. Search efforts are fully concentrated
in the district in which they generate the highest return. Because of scale effects
in search, resident B workers will have an incentive to search for jobs in district
A, whereas resident A workers will only search for jobs locally. The decision
balances the costs and benefits of inter-district job search. Figure 3.2 in section
3.2.3 already illustrated how the discrepancy between the reservation wages in
the two districts grew larger for highly skilled workers. Supermodularity of the
production process ensures skill complementarity, so that a worker’s benefit of
finding a better partner is increasing in her skill level. Lower inter-district job
search efficiency (ψ< 1) and commuting costs imply that low-skilled workers
will continue to concentrate their job search efforts locally. The skill cut-off
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium with inter-district job search ψ= 0.7
level s∗c above which workers commute is illustrated in panel B of Figure 3.3.
Since now even more workers are focusing their search efforts in district A, more
firms find it profitable to enter, further strengthening the quality of matches.
The opposite occurs in district B: the outflow of high-skilled workers reduces
the total number of searchers. This induces firms to widen their acceptance
set, which reduces the value of vacancies and lowers the number of vacancy
openings. Figure 3.4 illustrates how inter-district search increases the vacancy
density in A, at the expense of district B. The relative decrease is stronger
in B because of the initial size difference. Panel D of figure 3.3 shows that
inter-district search activities also affect the unemployment rate . Low-skilled
unemployment in B increases significantly as vacancy openings in the district
decline. On the contrary, the unemployment rate of B’s high-skilled workers
decreases, as they find jobs in the agglomerated district.
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Figure 3.4: Vacancy density in region A and B
The impact of fixed mobility costs on peripheral workers
Figure 3.5 illustrates the impact of a decline in the fixed cost of commuting on
the model’s equilibrium. The commuting cut-off level shifts leftwards. More
resident B workers can now afford to search for jobs in A. Importantly, as less
workers are now concentrating their job search effort in the peripheral district,
fewer firms will find it profitable to open a vacancy there. This puts a downward
pressure on local contact efficiency and deteriorates the labour market outcome
of low-skilled peripheral workers that are left behind. Their reservation wage
declines and unemployment level rises.
Interestingly, the labour market outcome of workers depends not only on the
size of the local labour market, but also on the size of the labour market in
neighbouring districts. High-skilled workers in the peripheral district are better
off located close to agglomerated areas, since production complementarities
imply that agglomerated areas offer them ‘a higher return to skill’. This enables
them to afford the commuting cost, which grants them access to the neighbour-
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Figure 3.5: The impact of commuting costs on reservation wages in B
ing labour market. As firms realise workers concentrate their search efforts in
the agglomerated areas, they decide to open vacancies there, at the expense of
the peripheral district. This hurts the remaining low-skilled peripheral workers,
who see their labour market prospects deteriorate. To the best of our knowledge,
this novel finding has not been documented before.
The model yields two important testable predictions:
1. The vicinity of agglomerated districts increases the match quality of high-
skilled workers.
2. The vicinity of agglomerated districts reduces the match quality of low-
skilled workers.
Both predictions will be tested using Belgian linked employer-employee data,
which are described in section 3.3.
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3.2.4 Related literature
The model described in section 3.2 is essentially an urban model with a poly-
centric structure. It analyses the impact of fixed geographic mobility costs
on workers’ labour market outcome, in the presence of random search, skill
complementarities in production and labour market pooling in the context of
an urban area with two employment centres.
Our model is closely related to the two-district model described in Coulson et
al. (2001), which shares a number of important features with the framework
applied in this chapter: an urban set-up with two points in space (CBD-SBD
setup), worker heterogeneity, search frictions, free entry of vacancies and mobil-
ity costs. Just as in our model, the agglomerated district exerts a pull effect on
peripheral workers. This pull effect is driven by a lower entry cost of vacancies,
which increases the contact rate and raises wages in the agglomerated district.
Coulson et al. (2001) further assume heterogeneous commuting preferences,
which in equilibrium lead to a selection of workers who commute from the
peripheral to the agglomerated district. Therefore, the peripheral district’s
workforce will also be partitioned into a group of commuters and one of non-
commuters. In our model, however, the pull effect is generated through scale
effects in search, making search more efficient in the agglomerated district. In
contrast to Coulson et al. (2001), we endogenise the selection effect by cou-
pling it to productivity through skill complementarities in production. This way
fixed mobility costs have a differential impact across skill-levels. Importantly,
both models lead to fundamentally different policy implications. Coulson et al.
(2001) show that reducing commuting costs between the two district is Pareto
welfare improving.10 A similar policy in our model would lead to a deterioration
of the labour market outcome of low-skilled workers in the peripheral district,
because the delocalisation of search efforts to the agglomerated area negatively
impacts the strength of labour market pooling effects in the peripheral district.
Labour market pooling effects are of central importance to our analysis. They
10For a similar model, see Ortega (2000), who concludes as well that mobility improves the
welfare of migrants, while leaving the outcome of left behind native workers’ unchanged.
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are introduced through a labour market assignment model where job-search
is subject to scale effects, resulting in a positive relationship between labour
market scale and matching quality. This relationship has been discussed and doc-
umented by several authors before us. Helsley & Strange (1990), for example,
were among the first to highlight the importance of scale and matching quality
in an urban context using a Salop (1979)-type model with non-hierarchical
heterogeneity. In contrast, our assignment framework with search frictions
builds on Shimer & Smith (2000) and is characterised by hierarchical agent
heterogeneity, which is an important driver of our main results. In their model,
scale effects in the search technology generate the positive relation between
labour market size and matching quality.11 Gautier & Teulings (2009) introduce
this framework in a system of cities and use scale effects in search to explain
differences in city size. The aim of this paper is not to explain urban scale, but
rather to examine the impact of costly spatial interaction between urban district
on the labour market outcome of workers.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Description
The main implications of the model are tested using a unique Belgian linked
employer-employee dataset (LEED), ranging from 1998 to 2008. This dataset
is collected by the Crossroads Bank for Social Security in Belgium. The data
covers nearly the entire Belgian population and initially consists of 35,721,027
observations, with each observation corresponding to a worker-firm-year com-
bination. At the worker-level the data provide information on age, gender,
gross daily wage (full time equivalent), location of residence and workplace,
labour market status, and an indicator of whether a worker is a full- or part-
time worker. At the firm-level, the data contains information on firm location,
number of employees, the industry in which the firm operates and an indicator
11A feature made more explicit by Teulings & Gautier (2004).
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of whether a firm is a single- or multi-plant firm. Firm and worker location
are reported at the level of the municipality. Municipalities are the smallest
administrative regions in Belgium of which there are a total of 589. This high
level of geographical disaggregation in the data allows us to construct detailed
measures of labour market size. One limitation of the firm-level data is that
there are no direct links between workers and establishments. However, an
indicator allows us to single out single-plant firms, which together account for
about 70 percent of total employment. For the remaining 30 percent of workers
we do not know with certainty their location of employment.
The analysis only covers the private sector. Belgium upholds a minimum manda-
tory schooling age of 18 and an official mandatory retirement age of 64, so we
only consider workers in the implied working age category. In case a worker
holds multiple jobs, only the primary job, defined as the one paying the highest
wage, is kept. Workers with wages in the bottom and top one percent of the
wage distribution are omitted from the sample, as well as those earning less
than the minimum wage. Section A.2 in the appendix provides a detailed de-
scription of the dataset and cleaning process. Table A.1 provides the summary
statistics for the sample.
3.3.2 Graphical illustration of the model’s driving mecha-
nisms
Underlying the model’s implication for the match quality of workers, two
important mechanisms are at play. First, resident workers from peripheral
districts are more likely to commute. Second, this decreases job openings in
the peripheral district. The two scatter plots in Figure 3.6 illustrate the first
mechanisms, as they show a negative correlation between the local commuting
rate and local density and a positive correlation between the local commuting
rate and the density of the neighbouring areas.12 Figure 3.7 illustrates the
12Commuters are defined as workers who work outside their resident municipality. The commut-
ing rate is defined as the ratio of commuters over total local population, at the municipality
level.
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(a) Local population (slope=-0.071, s.e.=0.002)
(b) Neighbouring population (slope=0.072, s.e.=0.0017)
Figure 3.6: Commuting rate and size of labour market
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second mechanism. The left panel shows a positive correlation between local
labour market density and the number of firms, whereas the right panel shows
that firm count is negatively correlated with the density of the neighbouring
area. Both observations illustrate the effect of labour market density on firm
count through the free entry condition, which drives vacancies to agglomerated
areas at the expense of the peripheral districts.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Measuring the strength of matching
Before proceeding with the calculation of match quality, we first need to deter-
mine worker and firm types. J. Abowd et al. (1999) propose a method based on
a simple Mincer wage equation applied to a panel of linked employer-employee
data. The presence of inter-firm worker mobility allows them to identify both
firm and worker effects. The correlation between firm and worker effect is
taken as a proxy for match quality. A number of studies using J. Abowd et
al. (1999)’s estimator failed to uncover any evidence of positive assortative
matching,13 which some have taken as evidence against labour market sorting.
However, Eeckhout & Kircher (2011) and Lopes de Melo (2009) argue that be-
cause of the non-monotonic effect of firm productivity on wages, identification
of worker and firm fixed effects based on J. Abowd et al. (1999)’s strategy will
fail to identify sorting. The non-monotonicity is driven by the observation that
wages of a given worker will follow an inverted U-shape around his optimal
allocation corresponding to the frictionless wage. The intuition goes as follows:
if a worker matches with a firm which is of a worse type than himself, his wage
will be lower than the frictionless wage. Note however that his wage will also
be lower if he matches with a better firm. In this case a larger part of the
matching surplus will accrue to the firm, as it will require compensation for its
willingness to match with a lower type. So a worker obtains the highest wage if
13Andersson et al. (2007) for the US, Lopes de Melo (2009) for France and Brasil.
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(a) Log Population of Local Market (slope=1.12, s.e.=0.0087)
(b) Log Population of neighbouring Areas (slope=-0.20, s.e.=0.0072)
Figure 3.7: Number of firms and size of labour market
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he meets the ‘right’ firm and the wage will be lower the further he is distanced
from his optimal match. The correlation between worker and firm fixed effects
calculated using J. Abowd et al. (1999)’s methodology will then be zero and
informative about neither the sign nor the strength of sorting.
Our identification strategy is based on Lopes de Melo (2009). His measure
of worker and firm types derives directly from wage data. Wage data implic-
itly incorporate all relevant skill and productivity characteristics regardless of
whether they are observable. Since in search models wages correlate positively
with worker type, the average wage of a worker Si =
∑
t∈Ti wi t
Ti
recovers the true
type of the worker, where Ti is the set of years that worker i is observed in
the data.14 We recognize that apart from skill differences, observed wages
also reflect variables unrelated to workers’ productive characteristics, such as
regional variations in labour market conditions, rent sharing or bargaining
power. To accommodate this, we construct our measure based on the ranking of
workers by their average wages within the same district. Our measure of firm
type derives from the quality of the workers it hires. We proceed by calculating
the average wage of firms j’s workforce, Pj =
∑
t∈Tj
∑
i∈Njt Si∑
t∈Tj N j t
, or alternatively by
taking the wage of the best worker that it employed during the sample period,
Pj = maxt∈T j ,i∈N j t (Si), where N j t is the set of workers employed in firm j at
time t, and T j is the set of years that firm j is recorded in the dataset. The
rank correlation between Si and Pj, Corr(Si, Pj), then measures the strength of
matching. The empirical analysis uses only firms that have at least 3 employees.
In addition, firms are required to be part of a ‘mobility cluster’. This means
that they must employ at least one employee that has switched firms over the
sample period.
There are three issues through which the construction of our measure of match
quality can pose a threat to our identification strategy. First, if rent-sharing
is common, this will lead to an overestimation of the strength of matching.
As long as rent-sharing does not systematically vary with labour market scale,
this is of no concern. In addition, long sample periods render this concern
14For another example of a study that uses wages as a skill proxy, see Eeckhout & Kircher
(2011), who measures skill-level by wages adjusted for house prices.
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irrelevant, as the measured match quality will converge to its true value if T
grows large. Second, the match quality measure will be affected by the degree
of inter-firm labour mobility. In the limit, no mobility would result in a perfect
correlation between firm and worker quality. Lack of worker mobility therefore
upward biases our measure. Since inter-firm mobility of workers has been
shown to depend on labour market scale (Freedman, 2008), this could pose
a threat to identification. For high-skilled workers, our estimates will provide
a lower bound for the true effect of surrounding labour market size on local
matching quality, which is predicted to be positive. For low-skilled workers,
however, the predicted effect is negative, so the mobility-bias will exaggerate
the true effect. To control for the possible artificial impact of inter-firm mobility
on our estimates, we supplement our empirical specification with a variable
measuring the job switching rate of workers, which measures the percentage
of local workers switching jobs in a given year. Third, by construction, the
strength of matching is higher for regions with a large mass of small firms.
Several studies have documented a positive correlation between city scale and
firm size (see for example Campbell & Hopenhayn, 2005; Manning, 2010). This
implies that our estimates for the effect of density on matching quality will
provide a lower bound for the true effect, which is especially problematic for
the specification of the group of low-type workers, where the effect of scale
on match quality is predicted to be negative. We resolve this by adding to the
empirical specification a control for local average firm size.
3.4.2 Empirical Specification
The quality of matching depends both on the size of the local labour market, as
well as the size of the labour market in neighbouring areas. Local labour market
scale positively affects match quality across skill-levels. This is not the case for
neighbouring labour market scale. Although neighbouring scale improves the
match quality of high-skilled workers, it diminishes it for low-skilled workers.
We will test these theoretical predictions using two specifications, one for each
skill-group. The high-skilled group contains all workers in the top 25 percentiles
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of the skill distribution, which means they have an average daily wage greater
than 121.50 Euro. The low-skilled group covers workers in the lowest 25
percentiles of skill distribution, whose daily wage does not exceed 81.74 Euro.
The following two equations will be taken to the data:
Corri∈r(Si, Pj)H = α0 +α1 lnpoplocal +α2 lnpopsur r + γX + εrH
Corri∈r(Si, Pj)L = β0 + β1 lnpoplocal + β2 ln popsur r + γX + εr L,
(3.18)
where Corri∈r(Si, Pj)H denotes the match quality for high type workers and
their corresponding firms, and Corri∈r(Si, Pj)L denotes the match quality of
their low type peers. The size of the local labour market Li is proxied by the log
of resident workers in the municipality. Accordingly, the log of resident workers
in the neighbouring areas controls for the scale of the surrounding labour
market. The geographical extent of the neighbouring labour market is defined
both in terms of distance and commuting time.15 Using the coordinates of the
municipalities’ geographical centroids, we calculate the great-circle distance
between them and for each municipality construct a surrounding circle with
a radius of 50km. 73.76 percent of all workers commute within this distance.
The measure excludes local resident workers. Estimation first proceeds with the
standard OLS estimator. Adding municipality fixed effects to the specification is
too demanding on the data as it oversaturates the model. Arguably, the relevant
year-to-year variation in the agglomeration measures is limited. In addition,
changes in population might not have a contemporary effect on match quality
because of the delayed response of vacancy creation to variations in labour
market scale. To avoid imposing an a-priori unknown and possibly ad-hoc lag
structure on the empirical model, we opt for the Random Effects estimator.
To get a feel for the spatial distribution of two of the model’s key variables, we
mapped our measure of match quality and municipality population in figure
3.8. Both variables show considerable non-random spatial variation.
15The results of the latter can be found in the appendix.
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(a) Municipality population anno 2002
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(b) Average municipality match quality anno 2002
Figure 3.8: Spatial distribution of population and match quality
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Match Quality and Size of labour Market
The average match quality for high-skilled workers is 0.24, while the average
match quality for low-skilled workers is 0.44.16 The estimation results of
equations 3.18 are presented in table 3.1 and A.2. The former table contains
the results where firm types are measured by the average workforce wage,
whereas the latter table presents the results using the alternative measure of
firm quality, proxied by the wage of the highest paid worker. We first estimate
a basic version of model and then add a number of additional control variables,
which accommodate the identification threats discussed in section 3.4. Results
are reported for both the OLS and RE estimator.
From Table 3.1, the size of the neighbouring district positively affects the match
quality of high-skilled workers, in line with the predictions of our model. Local
labour market scale does not have a significant effect on high-skilled match
quality. The estimates based on the Random Effects estimator in column (2) are
not much different from the OLS estimates. Columns (3) and (4) supplement
the specification with the additional control variables, which leaves the results
intact. The last four columns in Table 3.1 confirm the central contribution of this
chapter: labour market scale of the surrounding area has a significant negative
impact on the match quality of low-skilled workers. Locating in the vicinity
of agglomeration areas not only does not come to the benefit of low-skilled
workers, it actually deteriorates their labour market prospects. Interestingly,
the match quality of high-skilled workers is significantly lower in municipalities
along the language border. This is consistent with the findings of Persyn & Torfs
(2015b),17 who analyse the deterrent effect of the Belgian language barrier on
commuting behaviour.
16This does not contradict the predictions of our model, since the level of the match quality
depends on the density of workers in the respective parts of the skill distribution. The lower
match quality of high-skilled workers therefore reflects the fact that there are less high type
agents in the labour market, who therefore settle with suboptimal partners.
17A version of which can be found in chapter 1 of this thesis.
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Table 3.1: Match Quality and the Size of labour Market
High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
Log(pop) -0.0014 -0.0041 0.000062 -0.00022 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0047) (0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0028)
Log(pop of neighboring areas) 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0046) (0.0023) (0.0047) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0032)
Language border dummy -0.031∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.00089 -0.0013
(0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0025) (0.0060)
Average firm size -0.00037∗∗∗ -0.00081∗∗∗ -0.00092∗∗∗ -0.00050∗∗
(0.00013) (0.00030) (0.00011) (0.00022)
Average age of workers 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗ -0.0074∗∗∗ -0.0031
(0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0025)
Log(house price) -0.021∗∗ -0.0063 -0.0020 0.0065
(0.0088) (0.0058) (0.0038) (0.0056)
Job switch rate 0.22∗∗ 0.053 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗
(0.095) (0.052) (0.059) (0.048)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6,468 6,468 5,879 5,879 6,468 6,468 5,879 5,879
R-squared 0.015 0.014 0.04 0.034 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.14
Note: Unit is municipality. The dependent variable is match quality measured by the rank correlation between worker and firm types.
Firm types are measured by the average worker type a firm hires. House price is measured by the weighted average price of house, villa,
apartment and lot. Herstappe, the least populous municipality in Belgium, is dropped. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***
significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
A number of robustness checks test the sensitivity of our findings. The results
are reported in section A.3. Table A.2 presents the results using the alternative
measure of firm quality, measured by the wage of its highest paid worker. The
conclusions remain unaltered. Next, we exclude the 19 municipalities of the
Brussels Capital Region from the analysis. Brussels is the largest urban area
in Belgium and the results might be driven by a Brussels-effect. Excluding
Brussels leaves the results unaltered. As our data are firm-level, we are not able
to identify the direct link between workers and firms. In the dataset about 3
percent of firms are multi-plant firms, employing about one third of the total
number of employees. For this group of workers we cannot say with certainty
that their place of work recorded in the data corresponds to their true location
of employment. The dataset contains an indicator that allows us to distinguish
between single-plant and multi-plant firms. The last four columns of Table A.3
show the results obtained after omitting the latter group from the sample. The
conclusions remain unaltered. Table A.4 experiments with population density
as a measure of labour market scale. Also here, the main results still hold. In
Table A.5, we redefine the neighbouring area based on commuting time by car.
The results remain unaltered.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter illustrated how urban agglomeration externalities do not come
to the benefit of all workers if skills are complementary in production, search
activities are subject to scale effects and commuting is costly. Within an urban
area, workers choose to concentrate their job-search efforts in those districts
that provide them the highest return to search. If job-search is grows more
efficient with scale, agglomerated districts will attract search activities from
workers living in nearby peripheral districts, who balance the benefits associated
with scale effects with commuting costs that need to be paid for inter-district job
matches. This further encourages firms to open new vacancies in agglomerated
districts, at the expense of the periphery. A driving assumption in our framework
is that skills are complements in production. This makes that high-skilled
workers benefit more than proportionally from finding a better match. Low-
skilled workers living in peripheral districts will find that they cannot afford the
mobility cost and get isolated from the labour market pooling effects offered
by the surrounding agglomerated urban areas. They therefore not only fail to
benefit from nearby concentration of economic activity, they actually suffer and
see their labour market outcome deteriorate. We were able to test and confirm
this novel finding using a Belgian matched employer-employee dataset.
The added complexity of the assignment framework brings about an impor-
tant nuance to the policy recommendations commonly formulated in earlier
studies. A number of theories (Coulson et al., 2001; Ortega, 2000) predict
that policies aimed at decreasing the spatial disconnect between workers in
peripheral district and jobs in agglomerated areas will lead to Pareto welfare
improvements by alleviating the adverse labour market outcomes of peripheral
workers. Empirical studies have repeatedly confirmed that increased access
to jobs leads to improved labour market prospects (see Zenou, 2009, for a
discussion). However, these studies generally focus on the labour market out-
come of those workers that have been successfully targeted by such policies.
Our results suggest that policies aimed at increasing geographical mobility of
workers through commuting subsidies can have unintended consequences, as
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they will hurt the labour market outcome of left-behind low-skilled workers in
peripheral districts.
Chapter 4
Functional Labour Markets in
Belgium
4.1 Introduction
This chapter applies the methodology developed in Coombes et al. (1986) and
Bond & Coombes (2007) to construct functional labour markets for Belgium.
Administratively delimited geographic regions traditionally form the basis for
data collection and the economic analysis of labour markets. Their borders
are often drawn arbitrarily or rest on a purely historic basis. Consequently,
there is no reason to believe that administrative regions correspond to a labour
market in any economically relevant sense. In contrast to administratively
delimited labour markets, the boundaries of functional labour markets are
rooted in the behavior of economic agents. The construction of functional
labour markets serves several purposes. First and foremost, they constitute an
instrument to monitor regional labour market outcomes and allow to monitor
the effectiveness of labour market programs. Several countries have already
implemented functional labour markets as an official platform to gather labour
market statistics (the ‘Travel-to-Work for the U.K.’ (Bond & Coombes, 2007), the
‘zones d’emploi’ for France (Jayet, 1985), the ‘Sistemi locali del lavoro’ for Italy
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(Sforzi & Istituto nazionale di statistica (Italia), 1997), for example). Second,
functional labour markets are frequently used as a basis for economic analysis
(see for example Di Addario & Patacchini (2008), Hincks (2010), Spencer et al.
(2010), Manning (2010) to name but a few).
The Bond & Coombes (2007) algorithm starts from spatially highly disag-
gregated data on employment and commuting flows. Regions that interact
intensively in terms of commuting flows are merged sequentially. When all
areas are assigned, a map of the functional labour markets is obtained. We
propose a minor modification to the Bond & Coombes (2007) algorithm to re-
solve discontinuities in the initially constructed TTWAs. The functional labour
markets resulting from the Coombes method are commonly referred to as
Travel-To-Work-Areas, hereafter simply TTWAs.
The availability of commuting data from three different census waves (1981,
1991, 2001) allows us to study how the Belgian TTWAs have evolved over time.
More recently the Belgian Social Security Office has published commuting data
for 2007 which is disaggregated along a sector and gender dimension, allowing
us to construct sector and gender-specific TTWAs. A section with robustness
checks analyses the sensitivity of the results to the chosen parameter values.
No recent attempt has been undertaken to construct functional labour markets
based on nationwide Belgian commuting data using the Bond & Coombes
(2007) methodology. It is our hope that the results in this paper can serve the
Belgian statistical agencies in developing labour market statistics for functional
labour markets. It will provide policy makers with a meaningful labour market
monitoring tool and can serve as the geographical unit of analysis for future
studies on the Belgian regional labour markets.
4.2 Related literature
Next to the (Bond & Coombes, 2007) algorithm applied in this paper, a num-
ber of other delineation methodologies have been proposed in the literature.
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(Van der Laan & Schalke, 2001) develops a multi-level taxonomy to classify dif-
ferent studies that propose delineation methods. He distinguishes between an
inductive and deductive approach.1 Deductive delineation methods start from
a priori selected areas and subsequently construct functional regions around
them, using a selection of criteria. Deductive methods identify centres indepen-
dently and uses a different set of rules for the construction of the functional
region as a whole (Van Nuffel, 2007). An example of a deductive approach can
be found in the Census Agglomerations of Canada, whose construction departs
from a focal point (Census Metropolitan Area), which is selected based on a size
criterion. Surrounding areas are subsequently merged based on bilateral com-
muting links with the predefined center. In contrast, inductive methodologies
construct functional regions starting from the interaction between areas and
thus avoid pre-selecting certain focal points. An example of the latter approach
is the INTRAMAX-procedure, as proposed by Masserfil & Brown (1975). The
INTRAMAX method minimizes the between-area interaction (and maximizes
the within-area interaction) for a given number of regions. Díaz & Coombes
(2011) formulate an alternative classification for delineation methods and dis-
tinguish between hierarchical and rule-based delineation methods. Hierarchical
methods construct functional regions step-wise. Rule-based approaches provide
more flexibility as they evaluate the constructed region at each step through-
out the algorithm and allow for the possibility break up existing areas and
re-evaluating the allocation of its subelements.
The method applied in this chapter provides a middle ground between an
inductive and deductive approach. Although focal points play a crucial role
in the construction of the TTWAs, they are not identified independently of the
subsequent construction of the functional region. This can results in multi-polar
local labour markets with multiple centers of economic activity. In addition, its
rule-based character implies that at each stage of the algorithm, constructed
areas are re-evaluated, leaving open the possibility to break them up and re-
assign their respective elements to other areas.
1For an elaborate explanation of the different classifications, see Díaz & Coombes (2011),
Van der Laan & Schalke (2001).
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TTWAs have been constructed for a variety of countries: Casado-Díaz (2000)
for Spain, Andersen (2002) for Denmark, by Papps & Newell (2002) for New
Zealand and by Corvers et al. (2009) for the Netherlands. The popularity of the
Bond & Coombes (2007) method is derived from its simplicity and non-stringent
data requirements: the algorithm runs using a matrix of spatially disaggregated
commuting trips. The wide-spread availability of such data, both over time and
across countries, makes it possible to track the historical evolution of TTWAs
(see Papps & Newell, 2002; Coombes & Casado-Diaz, 2005), or compare the
geographical extent of labour market across different labour market segments
(see Green et al. (1986) for a comparison between TTWAs for male and female
workers or Casado Díaz et al. (2007) for TTWAs at the occupational level).
Furthermore, the resulting regions are constructed based on the principles of
non-overlap (Van der Laan & Schalke, 2001), which renders them particular
useful to serve as a basis for labour market monitoring or economic analysis.
We are not the first to illustrate the geography of labour markets in Belgium. The
first comprehensive study of commuting in Belgium we could find dates back
to 1957. (Dickinson, 1957) uses the 1947 census data to document commuting
behaviour in Belgium and the Netherlands. The concept of functional labour
markets was not yet developed at that time,2 so the analysis proceeds using
basic cartographic methods. The author nevertheless succeeds in providing an
interesting geographical representation of the post-war Belgian regional labour
markets. More recently, Coombes (1995) applies an early version of the TTWA
algorithm on the 1981 Belgian census data. Van Nuffel (2007) provides an
example of an inductive functional delineation method for Flanders. Boussauw
et al. (2011) does not construct functional labour markets, but rather studies
local commuting behaviour by focusing on regional variations in commuting trip
length and excess commuting rates. Similarly, Verhetsel et al. (2010) analyse
Belgian commuting patterns within pre-defined functional urban areas (Belgian
metropolitan areas).
2And the computing power needed to run the algorithms (which takes a full day to complete on
a 589X589 commuting matrix using modern day advanced processing strength) was lacking.
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4.3 Methodology
The methodology is described in Bond & Coombes (2007). It finds its origins in
earlier work by Coombes et al. (1986), but the algorithm evolved significantly
in response to advances in computational power and improved data-availability
(see Coombes et al., 1986; Coombes, 1998). This section will elaborate on the
algorithm in detail.
Consider the commuting flows between n areas. Let Fi j be the flow of commut-
ing trips from area i to area j. The number of workers that are residents of
area i is denoted by Ri and the number of workers who are employed in area
i by Ei. Note that Ri =
∑n
j=1 Fi j and Ei =
∑n
j=1 F ji. The methodology starts
from the view that areas can only be considered as economically meaningful
labour markets (TTWAs) if they are both large enough and their labour market
is sufficiently self-contained, both on the demand and the supply side. The
size of an area is measured in terms of total number of resident workers Ri.
An area’s ‘supply side self-containment’ is the ratio of the number of people
that both live and work in the area Fii to the total number of workers living
in the area Ri =
∑n
j=1 Fi j. ‘Demand side self-containment’ is the ratio of the
number of people that live and work in an area Fii to the number of jobs in the
area Ei =
∑n
j=1 F ji. To qualify as a TTWA, Bond & Coombes (2007) list three
requirements that need to be fulfilled simultaneously:
Rule 1 - An area with at least 25 000 resident workers requires both supply and
demand side self-containment to be higher than 66.67 percent.
Rule 2 - For areas with less then 25 000 resident workers, the minimum supply
and demand self-containment ratios linearly increase from 66.67 percent
to 75 percent for areas with 3 500 resident workers.
Rule 3 - A TTWA must have at least 3 500 resident workers.
In other words, Rule 1 states that to classify as a TTWA, size is not the only
thing that matters. The labour market must also be sufficiently self-contained.
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That is, both the share of jobs filled in by locals (demand), as well as the
share of resident workers that hold a job locally (supply) should be sufficiently
high. Rule 2 imposes stricter self-containment requirements for areas with less
than 25 000 residents. Small areas are only considered as independent labour
markets if their labour market is sufficiently self-contained and the interaction
withsurrounding areas is limited. Rule 3 puts a limit on the minimum size of
TTWAs, in terms of resident workers. The threshold values are similar to the
ones used in Bond & Coombes (2007), but can be adjusted to fit the needs of
the researcher and the problem at hand.3
Figure 4.1 illustrates the three rules. All areas that lie to the north-east of
the threshold line are considered valid TTWAs. Notice that the vertical axis
depicts the lower of the supply of demand side self-containment. Figure 4.1
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Figure 4.1: The X -equation, (after Bond & Coombes, 2007)
3For an illustration of the sensitivity of the algorithm’s outcome to the parameter values, see
4.6.4.
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corresponds to what Coombes et al. (1986) label ‘the X-equation’. It is the
algebraical representation of the threshold line in figure 4.1 evaluated at the
threshold levels set out by rules 1 to 3.
X i = min

1;
c1Ri
α
;
c2Ri + c3
α

× min

1;
Fii
βEi
;
Fii
βRi

. (4.1)
The X -index consists of two factors. A first factor rewards size in terms of
the number of resident workers. The second factor rewards self-containment,
having a large share of residents which work in the region relative to the number
of jobs and residents of the region. Only the smaller of supply-side and demand-
side self-containment matters for the calculation of the X -index. Regions that
are both large and self-contained will have a high X i, but the index allows for a
trade off between containment and size, since it rewards regions that are of
limited size but have sufficiently high self-containment levels. The required
parameter vector for Bond & Coombes (2007)’s rules to hold is {c1 = 6.35;
c2 = 0.129; c3 = 21783; α= 25000; β = 0.75}.4 This means that an area only
qualifies as a TTWA if it has an X -index above a threshold value of 0.88933.
The algorithm initially considers all areas as potential TTWAs. It starts from
the area least likely to qualify as a TTWA (lowest X i) and merges it to the area
with which it has the strongest commuting links. To measure the strength of
commuting links between two areas, the following formula counts the bilateral
travel-to-work journeys relative to the number of resident workers and jobs in
both regions.
Li j =
Fi j
Ri
.
Fi j
E j
+
F ji
R j
.
F ji
Ei
(4.2)
After merging the first two areas, n− 1 areas remain. For all remaining areas,
the X i-indices, as well as the Li j values are recalculated. Again, the area with
the lowest X i-index is chosen
5 and merged with the area with which it has
the strongest connections. These steps are iterated until the point where the
area with the lowest X i is a group of previously merged areas. Call this area
4In section 4.6.4 we show how sensitive the results are to the chosen threshold values implied
by the rules.
5During the first number of iterations, this will be likely a stand alone area which has not
previously been merged.
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A. Instead of considering area A as a whole, the group is dissolved and all its
elements are again considered as stand alone areas. They are joined one by one
with the area with which they have the strongest commuting links, the order by
which is determined by ranking them according to the total flow of outgoing
commuters
∑
j 6=i Fi j. If all the disentangled areas that formerly belonged to A
are merged, a new iteration begins by considering the area that is the furthest
away from being a TTWA. This process continues until all areas are TTWAs. As
a minor modification to the Bond & Coombes (2007) algorithm, we introduced
an additional final step. In this step each individual area gets separated from its
TTWA and reassigned to the TTWA which it has the strongest link, as indicated
by the Li j measure. This final step avoids a TTWA consists out of discontiguous
subelements, as the algorithm does not explicitly contain a rule preventing this.
4.4 Data description. Commuting flows in Belgium
We apply the algorithm on a matrix of commuting flows between the 589 Belgian
municipalities. These data stem from two different sources. Commuting data
for 1981, 1991 and 2001 were obtained from the Belgian Federal Bureau of
Economics and originate from 3 different census waves. The census based
commuting data contain only the total flow of workers between municipalities
and will be used to study the evolution of the TTWAs over time. For the year
2007, the commuting data stem from the Belgian National Social Security Office
(NSSO). Unlike the census data, the 2007 is disaggregated along a sectoral
and gender dimension. Both the census and NSSO data cover private and
public sector. However, the NSSO data do not include self-employed workers
whereas the census data do.6 As omitting the self-employed might bias the
obtained results,7 we do not explicitly extend the analysis on the evolution of
the TTWAs over time to include the 2007 TTWAs. The database takes the form
of an origin-destination flow matrix, consisting out of 5892 cells, where each
6See Verhetsel et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion and descriptive analysis of the 2001 census
commuting data.
7For a discussion on this matter, see section 4.6.1.
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cell represents a unique combination of two municipalities.
4.5 Belgian Travel-To-Work-Areas
Applying the algorithm8 on the 2007 Belgian commuting data gives rise to 11
distinct TTWAs, which are illustrated in Figure 4.2. Each TTWA is named after
Aarlen
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GenkGent
Eupen
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Kortrijk
Brussel/Bruxelles
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Flanders region
Wallonia region
Figure 4.2: The 2007-TTWAs for the aggregate economy
the ‘focal point’ with which it was merged in the final stage of the algorithm.
The black lines in figure 4.2 mark the provinces. It is interesting to see how the
administrative borders of provinces often coincide with those of the TTWAs.
Take the Genk TTWA for example, which apart from three municipalities,
8Calibrated using the parameter values described in section 4.3.
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coincides with the province of Limburg. Furthermore, the language barrier
separating the Northern region of Flanders from the Southern region of Wallonia
seems to act as an impediment for commuters. With the exception of the Brussels
TTWA and four French speaking municipalities that belong to the Kortrijk TTWA
in the east, the linguistic barrier coincides with the barriers of TTWAs. These
findings suggest an important role for linguistic factors in the determination
of commuting decisions and hence, the geographical extent of labour markets.
This is in line with the findings of Persyn & Torfs (2015b),9 who formally analyze
and quantify the effect of the language barrier on municipality commuting flows.
In a different study, Blondel et al. (2010) construct ‘Telephone Areas’, using
inter-municipality telephone traffic. They too find that the language border acts
as a strong deterrent factor for interaction between the North and the South of
Belgium.
4.6 Some applications
4.6.1 Evolution of time
In this section we consider how the Belgian TTWAs have evolved over time.
Figure 4.3 shows the Belgian TTWAs for the years 1981, 1991 and 2001. The
size of the functional labour markets in Belgium steadily increased over the
past three decades, resulting in a decrease in the total number of TTWAs from
30 in 1981 to only 21 in 2001.
The decline in the number of TTWAs reflects an increase in the geographical
mobility of the average worker. This led to the formation of fewer but larger
functional labour markets. The average commuting distance increased from
10.73 to 11.84 to 14.61 km over the different years.10 Van der Laan & Schalke
9A version of which can be found in Chapter 1.
10Commuting distances are calculated based on the coordinates of location of the town halls,
which is likely to coincide with the economical center of the city, rather than its geographical
center. This underestimates the true average commuting distance, as our calculation assumes
that the within municipality commuting distance is equal to zero. A comparison between the
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the Belgian TTWAs over time
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(2001) discusses the implicit centrality of the nature of mobility costs in the
TTWA methodology. If relative commuting costs decrease with the wage, be-
cause they are fixed or at least contain a fixed component, an increase in the real
wage will lead to longer commuting distances. Therefore, real wage increases
combined with an increasing degree of spatial concentration of economic activ-
ity can explain the emergence of larger and fewer TTWAs, as documented in
figure 4.3. Between 2001 and 2007, the number of TTWAs decreased further
to 11. However, a direct comparison between the lower panel of figure 4.3 and
figure 4.2 is problematic. Both figure are constructed from different source
data. The 2001 census data comprise the entire Belgian workforce, whereas the
2007 administrative data only counts payroll employees and does not contain
self-employed. Since by definition self-employed work and live in the same
location, The 2007 TTWAs will therefore be larger by construction, since they
omit the self-employed, which are considered non-commuters and therefore
boost the self-containment ratios. Our findings are consistent with other studies
that documented the tendency for TTWAs to grow over time (see for example
Newell & Perry (2005) between 1991 and 2001 for New-Zealand, and Coombes
et al. (1985) for South- and East-England).
4.6.2 Sector-specific TTWAs
The 2007 administrative payroll employment data are disaggregated according
to NACE-sector. We apply the classification proposed by Eurostat to construct
TTWAs for four different (private) sectors, subdivided according to technological
intensity: low-technology and high-technology manufacturing industries and
the less-knowledge intensive and knowledge intensive market services.11
2001 average commuting distance in Verhetsel et al. (2007), who had access to the complete
census questionnaires confirms this, as they report an average commuting distance of 17.2
km and 19.0 km for 1991 and 2001 respectively.
11The class of low-technology manufacturing industries groups low and medium-low tech
sectors and includes NACE2 sectors 15 to 22, 36 and 37, 23, 25 to 28 as well as NACE3
sector 35.1. The class of high-technology sectors groups high and medium-high tech sectors
and includes NACE2 sectors 29 to 35 as well as NACE3 sectors 24.4 and 35.3. The class of
less-knowledge intensive services include NACE2 sectors 50 to 52, 55, 60 and 63. The class
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Figure 4.4: The TTWAs for the manufacturing sectors
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(a) Low Tech Services
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Figure 4.5: The TTWAs the service sectors
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For low-tech manufacturing, 10 TTWAs emerge, one less than is the case for their
high-tech counterparts. This is driven by the difference in commuting distance
between the two sectors: commuters in low-tech industries travel on average
16.29 km , which is marginally less than the 17.04 km average commuting
distance in the high-tech manufacturing sector. The relationship between
technological intensity and the average commuting distance is substantially
stronger in the service sector. There are only 4 distinct high-tech TTWAs and
as much as 11 low-tech TTWAs. Workers in high-tech services commute on
average 27.1 km and low-tech service workers only 16.29 km. High-tech sectors
are subject to strong localisation economies (Henderson, 2003), providing them
with a strong incentive to cluster. If high-tech sectors pay higher wages, and
part of the commuting cost is fixed, this can explain the tendency of high-tech
workers to commute longer distances.
For the sake of comparison, figure 4.6 illustrates the TTWAs for the public sector.
Public employees commute on average 21.43 km, leading to the construction
of 11 distinctive public sector TTWAs. Note that the boundaries of the public
sector coincide remarkably well with the administrative province boundaries.
4.6.3 Gender-specific TTWAs
The matrix of commuting trips based on the 2007 administrative data was
disaggregated along a gender dimension, allowing us to construct gender
specific TTWAs.
Figure 4.7 reveals that female workers are substantially less mobile than males
workers. The algorithm detects up to 14 distinct TTWAs for female workers
and only 8 for males. This confirms the results of Green et al. (1986) and
Newell & Perry (2005), who construct gender-specific TTWAs for England and
New-Zealand, respectively. Woman tend to be employed in less-productive or
part-time jobs and therefore earn lower wages (Macpherson & Hirsch, 1995).
A recent study by the Belgian institute for gender equality reported a difference
of less-knowledge intensive services include NACE2 sectors 61, 62, 64 to 67 and 70 to 74.
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Figure 4.6: The 2007-TTWAs for the public sector
of 23 percent in yearly earnings between men and women. The presence of
a fixed component in commuting costs would therefore reduce their average
distance commuted, explaining why the TTWAs for female workers outnumber
the TTWAs for male workers.
4.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
So far, the algorithm used a similar parameter vector as the one applied in
Bond & Coombes (2007). This section will present a number of sensitivity
tests that illustrate the sensitivity of the algorithm to the chosen parameter
values. Both from a policy as from an analysis perspective, a crucial aspect
of a functional labour market is its degree of self-containment. The higher is
the self-containment level, the greater the effectiveness of local labour market
policies. An obvious candidate for a sensitivity analysis is therefore the minimum
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self-containment requirement an area needs to attain to qualify as a TTWA.
Increasing the self-containment ratio can be achieved either directly, by adjusting
the minimum containment requirements, or indirectly, by tightening the trade-
off between size and containment.
Name Supply Self-Cont. Demand Self-Cont. Resident Workers Total Jobs X i-index
Antwerpen 75.8% 75.8% 501470 512216 100
Brugge 77.6% 85.6% 278858 252867 100
Charleroi 78.5% 82.9% 245086 232109 100
Arlon 73.8% 79.1% 64284 59949 98.3
Eupen 72.8% 80.4% 218374 197749 97.1
Genk 72.0% 77.9% 75743 69946 96
Gent 72.0% 79.2% 161445 146777 96
Kortrijk 70.6% 83.8% 451441 380343 94.1
Brussel/Bruxelles 84.3% 69.0% 842954 1030915 91.9
Liège 67.8% 74.9% 305082 275925 90.4
Turnhout 66.7% 73.3% 156110 142051 89.0
Table 4.1: Statistics for the aggregate 2007 Belgian TTWA algorithm
The starting point of the robustness analysis are the aggregate 2007 TTWA
from figure 4.2, using the initial parameter set that is illustrated in figure 4.1.
Parameter choice is unavoidably arbitrary, but the technical algorithm results
summarized in table 4.1 can provide some guidance on how to adjust the
parameter set to achieve certain goals.
The supply-side self-containment levels of the TTWAs of Liège and Turnhout
only marginally pass the minimum requirements (66.67 percent). Also the
Brussels TTWA, due to its heavy reliance on labour supply from bordering
regions, has a relatively low demand-side self-containment. This gets reflected
in low values of the X i-index. As a first robustness checks, the minimum self-
containment requirement is increased from 66.67 percent to 70 percent. This
will lead to a reduction in the number of TTWAs, as the algorithm will break
up the TTWAs of Liège, Turnhout and Brussels and re-assign their subareas
to the other TTWAs. Figure 4.8a compares the 2007 aggregate TTWAs that
emerged using the initial parameter values (figure 4.2) to those resulting from
increasing the minimum self-containment requirement to 70 percent. The black
lines indicate the borders of the TTWAs corresponding to the initial parameter
set. A number of observations emerge: as expected, the TTWA of Turnhout
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was dissolved and assigned to its closest neighbours Antwerp and Genk. The
Brussels TTWA dissolved as well and merged with Gent and Charleroi to form
a large, seemingly heterogeneous, labour market, ranging all the way from the
northern Dutch border to France. Intuitively, this does not seem to make a lot of
sense. It is hard to imagine that labour market policy tailored for the needs of
the northern regions of East-Flanders would be effective in the French-speaking
south, whose labour market issues are of a very different nature.12
Given the economic important of the Brussels capital region, which is considered
to be the focal point of economic activity in Belgium, it would be desirable if the
Brussels area would independently qualify as a TTWA, instead of being broken
up and assigned to other TTWAs. From table 4.1, we see that the Brussels
capital region is highly self-contained on the supply side. Of all its resident
workers, 85 percent also work within the TTWA borders. On the demand side
however, the Brussels TTWA relies heavily on the surrounding areas to fill
the jobs on its territory. This is not surprising given the central importance of
Brussels in the Belgian economy and its geographic centrality. By increasing the
size threshold that determines the trade off between size and self-containment,
the algorithm’s parameters provide a way to avoid breaking up the Brussels
region, while at the same time increasing the self-containment requirements for
smaller, peripheral TTWAs. As before, self-containment levels become stricter,
but since this occurs through strengthening the trade-off between size and
self-containment, this is only the case for sparsely populated TTWAs. Table
4.1 again provides some guidance on the required magnitude of the parameter
adjustment required to reduce the TTWAs while avoiding the dismantlement of
the Brussels TTWA. The Turnhout TTWA has the lowest self-containment levels,
just equal to the minimum of 66.67 percent on the supply-side. It however,
relatively large in terms of size as it is home to 156 110 resident workers. The
size threshold therefore needs exceed this level in order to directly affect the
Turnhout TTWA. Setting it to 200 000 brings about 10 distinct functional labour
markets, as illustrated in figure 4.8b. They coincide for a large part with the
12(See Torfs, 2008, for an elaborate discussion on the state of the labour markets in the Belgian
regions).
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(a) Increasing the self-containment requirement in Rule 1 from 66.67 percent
to 70 percent.
(b) Increasing the size threshold in Rule 1 from 25 000 to 200 000
Figure 4.8: Sensitivity analysis
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original result. As expected, the Turnhout region failed to qualify as a separate
TTWA and it was dissolved and merged with Antwerp in the west and Genk
in the east. Apart from a few municipalities that were reassigned to adjacent
TTWAs, the parameter adjustment invoked no further significant changes in
the initial 2007 TTWAs.
Although it is not possible to escape the arbitrariness associated with parameter
selection, one can use a combination of the algorithm statistics, graphical
analysis and common sense, to adjust the parameters in order to achieve, or
avoid, certain outcomes.
4.7 Summary & discussion
This paper applied the Bond & Coombes (2007) algorithm to construct Travel-
to-Work Areas for Belgium. The 2007 aggregate economy result revealed
the existence of 11 distinctive labour markets, the boundaries of which often
coincided with administrative areas. The size of TTWAs is closely related to
workers’ average commuting distance. More commuting implies larger TTWAs.
Increasing commuting distances have led the total number of Belgian TTWAs
to decrease over time, from 31 in 1981 to 21 in 2001. We find that as average
commuting distance increased over between the census years 1981 and 2001,
the number of distinctive TTWAs decreased, going from 31 to 21. For the year
2007 sectoral level TTWAs were constructed, where sectors were categorized
according to technological intensity. TTWAs are on average smaller for low-tech
sectors, as well as for female workers. The heavy reliance on the parameter
set, whose choice of values is necessarily arbitrary, is an undesirable feature of
any delineation methodology designed to construct functional labour markets.
Sound judgement combined with careful inspection of the algorithm’s statistics
could guide a researcher in determining a reasonable set of parameters that suits
the needs of the case at hand. The sensitivity analysis attempted to decrease the
number of TTWAs produced by the algorithm. To achieve this, we illustrated the
difference between directly increasing the self-containment ratio and adjusting
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the size-containment trade-off. The latter approach delivered results that were
more satisfactory, as it avoided breaking up the important central TTWA of
Brussels.
It is our hope that the results presented in this chapter will inspire policy
makers to use the TTWAs as an economically meaningful monitoring tool for
Belgian regional labour market performance. To illustrate why this is important,
consider the case of the Brussels Capital Region. When assessing its labour
market performance, it is most often compared to the other Belgian NUTS1-
regions, Flanders and Wallonia. In 2007, the Brussels unemployment rate was
over 21.6 percent, compared to 16.8 in Wallonia and only 6.3 in Flanders.13
The results of this analysis14 suggest this might not be fair comparison. It
is a well-documented fact that the geographic distribution of unemployment
within an urban area is non-random (Anas et al., 1998; Zenou & Patacchini,
2009; Dujardin et al., 2008). The Brussels Capital Region, as delineated by
the administrative NUTS1 borders, constitutes only the centre part of the
functional urban area of Brussels. The Brussels TTWA (figure 4.2) further
contains important parts of the Brabant provinces, along both sides of the
language barrier. Brabant Wallon and Vlaams Brabant are both prosperous
regions, with low unemployment and a highly educated workforce (Torfs, 2008).
Brueckner et al. (1999) argue that the Brussels city structure follows the U.S.
pattern, with disconnect between the Central Business District unemployed
and the jobs in the surrounding Suburban District. Therefore, comparing the
labour market outcome of the Brussels Central Business District to Wallonia
and Flanders, which are large regions with a complex network of multiple
cities, might not be a very informative exercise. Figure 4.9 illustrates this,
by comparing the unemployment rate of the Brussels Capital Region and the
Brussels TTWA. The unemployment rates in the functional Flanders and Walloon
region are simply the administrative unemployment rates adjusted for the
municipalities that belong to the Brussels TTWA. Although the unemployment
rate in the latter two regions increases only marginally, the relative position
13Based on the administrative unemployment data provided by Steunpunt WSE.
14As well as the results of other studies on functional economic regions in Belgium, such as
Luyten & Van Hecke (2007).
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of the three regions changes significantly. As important parts of the Brabant
provinces are assigned to the Brussels TTWA, its unemployment rate decreases
drastically from 21.6 to 12 percent. The performance of the Brussels urban
labour market is better than it appears from the official NUTS1 statistics.
6.3% 
21.6% 
16.8% 
7% 
12% 
17% 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Flanders Brussels Wallonia
Administrative (NUTS1) Functional (TTWA)
Figure 4.9: Functional versus administrative areas: unemployment rates
The algorithm further revealed a number of interesting geographic features of
the Belgian functional labour markets. The regional border between Flanders
and Wallonia appears to be a source of significant spatial frictions on the
labour market. This was analysed and confirmed by Persyn & Torfs (2015b).
This results is not entirely surprising, given the language barrier faced by
commuters crossing the Flanders-Wallonia border. Interestingly, the TTWA
borders produced by the algorithm at times coincide remarkably well with the
borders of the administrative provincial regions (NUTS2). It is likely that the
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borders of the provinces are historically determined around a focal point. It is
remarkable that the relative importance of these focal points is still reflected
in today’s commuting behaviour. Persyn & Torfs (2015a) apply the Persyn &
Torfs (2015b) framework to test whether this can explain the persistence of
the historical provincial border on current day commuting decisions. They find
that controlling for the geographical distribution of economic activity does not
eliminate the border effect. What is driving this peculiarity has to be left as a
venue for future research.
General conclusion
The impact of space on labour market outcomes takes many forms. Space is
inextricably bound up with time. And time is money. The analysis in Chapter 1
analysed the impact of space on commuting behaviour and quantified the costs
space imposes on workers. Using a gravity equation framework, I showed that
not only distance imposes spatial frictions on the labour market, but also how
regional borders affect workers’ commuting decisions. Border-induced frictions
are surprisingly strong: regional border crossings reduce commuter flows by
30 percent. This effect varies depending on which border is considered and
in which direction it is crossed. The graphical analysis of the wage impact of
the border frictions revealed that border municipalities with depressed labour
market outcomes that are located nearby cross-border areas with an abundance
of employment opportunities could gain most from policies aimed at promoting
cross-border commuting.
Interestingly, the analysis of Chapter 3 led to a more nuanced conclusion. Using
a more refined urban framework, with heterogeneity on both sides of the labour
market, labour market pooling externalities and skill-complementarities in
production, revealed that policies aimed at reducing space-related frictions do
not necessarily come to the benefit of all workers. We show that peripheral
low-skilled workers that reside in the vicinity of agglomerated areas suffer twice.
First, mobility costs restrict their job-search radius and excludes them from the
agglomerative benefits of dense urban areas. Second, because firms increasingly
locate in agglomerated areas to reap the benefits of the concentration of job
search activities, at the expense of the periphery. Job opportunities for the
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low-skilled workers left behind in the peripheral region decline further. Chapter
3 analyses the impact of the fixed part of the commuting costs. The combination
with skill-complementarities in production and scale effects in search triggers
the selection effect that drives our most important result. So policies that aim to
promote interregional labour market integrate and target the fixed part of the
commuting cost are not Pareto welfare improving, even when considering its
effect on the workers of peripheral areas only. The analyses in Chapters 1 and
3 are both of partial equilibrium nature. This implies that policy conclusions
should be drawn with caution.
Scale effects in search are an important driver of the results in Chapter 3. This
is an example of a labour market pooling externality, discussed at length in
Chapter 2. Labour market pooling is one of the three Marshallian sources of
agglomeration externalities, which are used to motivate the existence of cities.
Although their exists a number of excellent survey papers reviewing different
aspect of urban agglomeration externalities, an overview of labour market
pooling source was still missing. Chapter 3 filled this void. The survey paid
particular attention to linking theory with empirical evidence. It can provide
researchers in the field with an overview what already has been done and could
inspire them to uncover what is still missing.
Finally, Chapter 4 illustrated the geographical structure of Belgium’s local labour
markets by constructing Travel-To-Work-Areas. The results confirmed some of
the conclusions drawn in the previous chapters, such as the deterrent effect of
the Flanders-Walloon border on commuter flows. Using the Brussels Capital
Region as an example, I illustrated why labour market monitoring best proceeds
using functionally delineated areas, rather than administrative region.
This dissertation illustrated, analysed and quantified the impact of spatial fric-
tions on workers’ commuting decisions. Although commuting costs are often
compensated for, either by employers or government subsidies, this compensa-
tion does not add to a worker’s utility, rather it compensates for utility gone
lost. The impact of space on the labour market can be interpreted as a waste-
ful tax on commuting. The analyses in this dissertation show that reducing
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spatial frictions on the labour market could potentially result in large welfare
gains. However, policy makers need to consider the unintended consequences
of mobility subsidies, in particular for those workers that are not successfully
targeted.
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Appendix A
A.1 Chapter 3 - extensions
A.1.1 Extension: worker migration
Throughout the analysis, the only way workers living in the peripheral district
had access to the agglomerated area by commuting. Here, we extend the
analysis by allowing workers to migrate. This endogenizes the regional skill
distribution. As was the case for commuting, residents in region A have no
incentive to move to region B, since the reservation wage A exceeds that of B
for all skill levels. Workers face a migration cost of Cm > 0, which is assumed
to be larger than the cost of commuting.1 Particularly, Cm is set to 0.55 in the
simulation. Workers in district B will migrate if the inter-district gap of the
value of unemployment is larger than the migration cost. The incremental value
of a mover net of migration cost must be zero in equilibrium. The migration
equilibrium condition for residents in district B is:
UA(s)− UB(s) = Cm (A.1)
The upper right panel in Figure A.1 illustrates the cutoffs for migration and
commuting. Because the increase in the expected value from moving increases
1The cost of migration can be interpreted as the house price gap between the central and the
peripheral district. For simplicity, we assume this gap is exogenously given.
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Figure A.1: Equilibrium: Migration
with worker types, only the highest skilled workers (above s∗m) will migrate.
As before, workers in the mid-range of the skill distribution (s∗c , s
∗
m) search for
jobs in district A and choose to commute. Low-skilled workers (< s∗c ) in district
B continue to search jobs locally. Figure A.2 shows the post-migration skill
distribution of workers in both districts. Initially identical, the agglomeration A
now has disproportionately more high-skilled workers.
A.1.2 Housing market
The focus on this paper is on the labour market, so section A.1.1 makes a
reduced form assumption which implies migration costs reflect relative real
estate prices. Here we describe how the results are affected if we endogenise
the housing market. Each region has a fixed stock of housing Hi. A type s
worker in district i has the following preferences:
Max U(ci(s), hi(s)) = ci(s)
1−αhi(s))α
s.t. ci(s) + hi(s)Pi ≤ wi(s)
(A.2)
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Figure A.2: Skill Distribution in Region A and B
where ci(s) and hi(s) refer to the consumption of goods and housing, respectively
and Pi refers to the rental price. In equilibrium, we have ci(s) = (1−α)wi(s) and
hi(s) = α
wi(s)
Pi
, where α is the expenditure share on housing. Thus, the utility of
a type s worker in district i is Ui(s) = (1−α)1−ααα wi(s)Pαi . The rental price in i is
Pi =
α
∫
wi(s)li(s)Li
Hi
, which is a function of the local total wage. Substituting it into
the utility function, we have Ui(s) = (1− α)1−α wi(s) ∫ wi (s)li (s)Li
Hi
α . When migration
costs are exogenously given, the utility of worker s in district i is Ui(s) = wi(s).
The wage premium increases house prices in the agglomerated district. Since
residential location is a trade-off between commuting costs and land costs,
high-skilled workers will migrate to the agglomerated district.
A.1.3 Relocation of firms
Firm productivity is a random draw from a common distribution. The investment
decision of firms is irreversible and once settled, firms are not allowed to relocate.
This renders the distribution of productivity identical across districts. If firms
are allowed to relocate, high productivity firms will relocate to the large district.
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The reward to search in the agglomeration district increases, increasing the
number of peripheral high skilled workers who concentrate their search efforts
in the agglomerated district. The results of the model are reinforced.
A.2 Data cleaning process
• We start with 35,721,027 observations, each of which corresponds to a
worker-firm-year cell.
• All observations with a wage below the 1st percentile or above the 99th
percentile of the wage distribution are dropped. This leaves us with
34,655,478 observations.
• Workers who earn less than a minimum wage are dropped.2 This leaves
us with 33,894,307 observations.
• We restrict the sample to the private sector. Using the NACE rev1 classifi-
cation, firms operating in a 2-digit NACE sector above 74 are dropped.
This leaves us with 20,390,188 observations.
• We also discard workers living abroad. The final database contains
20,126,230 observations.
A.3 Robustness checks
This section presents the results of the respective robustness checks that were
discussed in section 3.5 of Chapter 3.
2The monthly gross statutory minimum wage is 1186.31 Euro in Belgium in 2004, which is
equivalent to 54 Euro of gross daily wage.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Observations 1,736,435 1,771,767 1,833,817 1,855,065 1,838,201 1,816,125 1,834,323 1,847,400 1,881,983 1,926,683 1,784,431
Daily wage 94.76 96.47 99.90 103.21 105.08 106.46 108.74 111.95 114.20 115.49 121.80
Age 37.07 37.15 37.14 37.38 37.70 38.03 38.20 38.40 38.54 38.65 38.93
Job switch rate(%) . 0.101 0.101 0.093 0.123 0.076 0.076 0.074 0.087 0.087 0.084
Male(%) 70.49 69.68 68.76 67.93 67.46 67.14 66.61 66.13 65.60 64.87 66.89
Population 2932.05 3008.09 3113.44 3149.52 3120.89 3083.40 3114.30 3136.50 3195.22 3271.11 3029.59
Average firm size 14.57 14.35 14.31 14.20 13.87 13.58 13.56 13.57 13.72 14.03 13.93
Multi-plant firms(%) 2.84 2.81 2.70 2.70 2.64 2.66 3.15 3.32 3.39 3.39 3.44
No. of firms 120,259 125,080 129,888 132,432 134,257 135,481 137,103 138,000 139,148 139,442 134,679
Note: Daily wage is the full-time equivalent gross daily wage, expressed in Euro. Population is defined as the average number of working population at municipality
level. The sample is restricted to workers aged 18-64. Source: Author’s calculation.
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Table A.2: Robustness check: alternative measure of firm type
High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
Log(pop) -0.0085∗∗∗ -0.0098∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0047) (0.0020) (0.0049) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0032)
Log(pop of neighboring areas) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0037)
Language border dummy -0.016∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ 0.0062∗∗ 0.0076
(0.0028) (0.0082) (0.0030) (0.0071)
Average firm size 0.00055∗∗∗ 0.00018 -0.00019∗ -0.00027
(0.00014) (0.00030) (0.00011) (0.00026)
Average age of workers -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0024 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0010
(0.0017) (0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0029)
Log(house price) 0.010 -0.00025 0.0063∗∗ 0.0064
(0.011) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0043)
Job switch rate 0.29∗∗∗ -0.096 -0.22∗∗∗ -0.10∗
(0.10) (0.091) (0.068) (0.051)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6468 6468 5879 5879 6468 6468 5879 5879
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.037 0.023 0.071 0.070 0.056 0.052
Note: Unit is municipality. The dependent variable is match quality measured by the rank correlation between worker and firm types.
Firm types are measured by the best worker type a firm hires. House price is measured by the weighted average price of house, villa,
apartment and lot. Herstappe, the least populous municipality in Belgium, is dropped. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***
significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.3: Robustness checks: excluding Brussels and multi-plant firms
Exclude Brussels Single-plant Firms
High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
ln(pop) 0.00086 -0.00027 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0038 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0065) (0.0018) (0.0038)
ln(pop of neighboring areas) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗ -0.0069∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ -0.0053∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0048) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0022) (0.0041)
language border dummy -0.031∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.0030 -0.0036 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.0060∗ -0.0066
(0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0025) (0.0060) (0.0037) (0.0094) (0.0034) (0.0082)
average firm size -0.00068∗∗∗ -0.00096∗∗∗ -0.00033∗∗∗ -0.00021 -0.00063∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.00073∗∗
(0.00018) (0.00036) (0.00012) (0.00027) (0.00018) (0.00040) (0.00014) (0.00031)
average age of workers 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.0088∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.00064
(0.0018) (0.0037) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0049) (0.0015) (0.0033)
ln(house price) -0.023∗∗ -0.0062 0.0011 0.0077 -0.0075 0.0030 -0.016∗∗ 0.0019
(0.0090) (0.0059) (0.0035) (0.0057) (0.013) (0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0060)
job switch rate 0.23∗∗ 0.059 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.038 -0.21∗∗ -0.12
(0.096) (0.053) (0.060) (0.049) (0.11) (0.11) (0.095) (0.094)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5689 5689 5689 5689 5879 5879 5879 5879
R-squared 0.043 0.037 0.16 0.15 0.099 0.093 0.091 0.083
Note: Unit is municipality. The dependent variable is match quality measured by the rank correlation between worker and firm types. Housing
price is measured by the weighted average price of house, villa, apartment and lot. Herstappe, the least populous municipality in Belgium, is
dropped. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.4: Robustness check: population density
Average Worker Type Best Worker Type
High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE
ln(emp./sq.km.) -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0047 0.0028∗∗ 0.0024 -0.0096∗∗∗ -0.0096∗∗ 0.0030∗∗ 0.0056∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0039) (0.0012) (0.0028)
ln(emp./sq.km. in neighboring areas) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.0037∗ -0.0081∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0074) (0.0021) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0085) (0.0023) (0.0049)
language border dummy -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.0034 -0.0047 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ 0.0050 0.0065
(0.0029) (0.0083) (0.0025) (0.0061) (0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0030) (0.0072)
average firm size 0.000018 -0.00068∗∗ -0.00071∗∗∗ -0.00031 0.00051∗∗∗ 0.00017 -0.000064 -0.00020
(0.00015) (0.00031) (0.00012) (0.00024) (0.00015) (0.00030) (0.00012) (0.00028)
average age of workers 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0046∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0016 0.0020∗ -0.00033
(0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0012) (0.0028)
ln(house price) -0.019∗∗ -0.0062 -0.0013 0.0067 0.0053 -0.00045 0.010∗∗∗ 0.0069
(0.0092) (0.0058) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.011) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0044)
job switch rate 0.30∗∗∗ 0.058 -0.28∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ 0.25∗∗ -0.099 -0.19∗∗∗ -0.095∗
(0.095) (0.052) (0.059) (0.047) (0.11) (0.091) (0.068) (0.051)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879 5879
R-squared 0.039 0.032 0.13 0.12 0.032 0.024 0.054 0.051
Note: Unit is municipality. The dependent variable is match quality measured by the rank correlation between worker and firm types. House price is
measured by the weighted average price of house, villa, apartment and lot. Herstappe, the least populous municipality in Belgium, is dropped. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.5: Robustness check: commuting time
High-skilled Workers Low-skilled Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS RE OLS RE
Log(pop) 0.00036 0.00021 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0046) (0.0013) (0.0028)
Log(pop of neighboring areas) 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0073∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0051) (0.0015) (0.0031)
Language border dummy -0.031∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.00088 -0.0013
(0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0025) (0.0061)
Average firm size -0.00030∗∗ -0.00079∗∗∗ -0.00098∗∗∗ -0.00055∗∗
(0.00013) (0.00030) (0.00011) (0.00022)
Average age of workers 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗ -0.0078∗∗∗ -0.0035
(0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0025)
Log(house price) -0.020∗∗ -0.0062 -0.0033 0.0062
(0.0088) (0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0056)
Job switch rate 0.26∗∗∗ 0.055 -0.29∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗
(0.094) (0.052) (0.059) (0.048)
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Observations 5879 5879 5879 5879
R-squared 0.038 0.032 0.15 0.14
Note: Neighbouring areas are constructed based on commuting time by car, where we
define the surrounding labour market as all municipalities that can be reached within 60
minutes, which cover 84.79 percent of all commuters. The data was obtained through
the Google Maps API and reflect the situation in June 2011. Unit is municipality. The
dependent variable is match quality measured by the rank correlation between worker
and firm types. House price is measured by the weighted average price of house, villa,
apartment and lot. Herstappe, the least populous municipality in Belgium, is dropped.
The neighboring areas in the first four columns are the regions which can be reached via
railway within 120 minutes from the region of residence. The neighboring areas in the last
four columns are the regions which can be reached via auto-highway within 60 minutes
from the region of residence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at
the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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